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CONCEPTS AND ACTIONS THROUGH 1942 
Introduction 
In the days since 1945, many people in the United States and 
throughout · the Western world have doubted the efficacy of the United 
Nations as a world organization to keep the peace . Many questions have 
been asked over and over again by the people in these countries. Why 
doesn't the United Nations expel the Soviets when they seem to be the 
main trouble makers in the world? Why did the United States join the 
United Nations in the first place when it was known there would be no 
resolution of the power politics question? Why did the United States 
join the United Nations when its own security would have been better 
served if it had kept its traditional policy of isolationism? Why 
were the veto and unanimity clauses included in the Charter when it 
could be seen that these clauses, in effect, would halt action on the 
part of the United Nations? 
The people have asked these questions in all sincerity and , 
in the light of recent events, it might seem that their views are the 
correct ones. It is necessary, therefore, to make an analysis of the 
fundamental reasons why the United States j oined the United Nations at 
all , or in joining the organization, why the United States did not 
make it stronger than it is. In making such an analysis we must look 
at the fundamental viewpoints of the two great powers in the world 
1 
2 
today. We must examine their concepts o a world organization. He 
must see exactly how much of their national sovereignty they were will-
ing to sacrifice. As the question of hovr much sovereignty was to be 
given up revolved around the question of great povrer unanimity and 
the veto, it is necessary to scrutinize the Russian and American atti-
tudes which lay behind the inclusion of these two principles in the 
United Nations Charter. 
In makin such an analysis, it is necessary to go back into 
history, to see why the Russians and Americans arrived at certain 
conclusions and principles contained in the United Nations Charter . 
Such an examination of history will lead to the conclusion that all 
nations are primarily concerned with the problem of security . In 
trying to obtain the best security it follows from necessity that each 
nation must first of all be concerned vri th its own national security . 
Because of this primary concern, nations are forced to play power 
politics . 
Cordell Hull once made a statement to this effect : 
. . . , our fundamental national interests are - as they 
always have been - the assuring of our national security 
and the fostering of the economic and social •rell-being of 
our people . To maintain these interests, our foreign 
policy must necessarily deal ,.,i th current conditions and 
must plan for the future in the light of concepts and 
beliefs which •re as a nation accept for oursllves as the 
guiding lines of our international behavior . 
As long as we live in a world of international anarchy , all 
nations are afraid to let go of their foothold on national security 
lLouise W. Holborn, War and Peace Aims of the United Nations 
(Boston: Horld Peace Foundation, 1948), II , p . 237 . 
3 
until they are assured of international security.2 This , of course, 
leads to the playing of power politics . Some people say when speaking 
of power politics that it fosters international anarchy. When speaking 
of their ovm nation's policies, however, these people would say that 
power politics is synonymous with national defense.3 Power politics, 
in the strict sense, however, does not necessarily imply the misuse of 
power. 
With such definitions in mind, we can study the foreign 
policies of the United States and the Soviet Union from the end of 
the first world war to the end of the second world war and see how the 
retreat from isolationism on the part of both of these countries was, 
in reality, a search for greater national security . 
Post - Horld War I Concepts and Attitudes 
of Soviet Russia 
Concepts and attitudes in the Twenties and early Thirties . --
Russia emerged from the first world vTar with the idea that her national 
interests could be better served by pursuing a policy of withdrawal 
from the affairs of Europe . Russian leaders arrived at this conclusion 
because nothing was gained from Russia 's participation in the war. 
Soviet leaders, after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, concluded that 
the war had only furthered the interests of the capitalistic nations, 
2
vera 1icheles Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace (New York : 
Whittlesey House, 1946), p . xiii . 
3Frederick Schuman, "Regionalis:rrl and the Spheres of Influence", 
Peace, Security, and the United Nations, Hans Mor enthau, ed . (Chica o, 
University of Chicago Press, 1947), p . 90 . 
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the industrialists, and the international bankers . 4 The actions of 
Russia's erstwhile allies, Soviet leaders felt, justified this con-
elusion. Soviet Russia was not invited to participate in the Paris 
Peace Conference. Her territory was invaded by the Poles with the 
tacit consent of the Allies for the purpose of doing avay •1i th the 
revolutionary government . Russian territory in Siberia was invaded, 
not in theory but in fact, by the Allies to restore the rule of the 
Czars. This· theory of the Soviet rulers was further implemented by 
the fact that Russia 's former territories were not restored to her, 
and by the fact that the Allies considered the new Soviet government 
to be a dangerous one and consequently withheld recognition . 5 
Conclusions in regard to the League. --The Soviet Union's 
conclusions in regard to the League were reached because of the fear 
that the League was nothing more than a post-YTar alliance between 
the YTartime allies to keep the Soviet Union under control. A note 
from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-
General of the League, March 15, 1923, states the viev~oint of the 
Soviet government: 
It regards it (the League) as a coalition of certain 
states endeavoring to usurp the power over other states 
and making their attempts on the rights and independence 
of other nations on a false appearance of groundless 
le ality and in the forms of mandates issued by the 
Council or • . • the Assembly of the League of Nations . 
The Soviet Government maintains its conviction that this 
pseudo-international body really serves as a policy of 
certain great powers or their vassals . The Soviet 
Government finds confirmation of its conviction every 
time that a state assuming the leading role in the League 
11Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Lenin ( Ne,·r York : Simon 
and Schuster, Avon edition, 1967), p. 505; Edward W. Pearlstein, 
(editor), Revolution in Russian, as reported by the New Yor k Tribune 
and the New York Herald , ltl94-1921 (Nev York: The Viking Press, 1967), 
pp . 192- 193 . 
5Pearlstein, p . 194. 
of Nations makes a decision on international ~uestions 
touching the interest of the Soviet Republic. 
5 
Other statements by the Soviet government reiterated this 
vie1olpOint. 7 
Russia still maintained that the League was a farce and held 
no povrer because of the militaristic attitudes of the various Western 
states who vrere looking for security . She maintained that the League, 
hovrever, vrished to keep up the appearances of fUnctionin and search-
ing for peace by sending out invitations to all nations, including 
Russia, to join in an international disarmament conference . Soviet 
Russia accepted the invitation anticipating, of course, that the 
conference would end in failure . Her purpose in attending the con-
ference 1-ras to prove to the 1-rorld that statements made by her 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Haxim Litvinov, to the effect that 
total disarmament was the only way to end vrars 8 was in reality, a 
prime consideration in Soviet foreign policy . 9 Litvinov, at the con-
ference , reiterated earlier statements to the effect that total 
general disarmament 1-ras the only way to put an end. to wars . He main-
tained that no other type of disarmament would work because, with 
weapons , other nations would still look after their security with 
these weapons . Total disarmament, Li tvinov declared 1-rould bring 
every nation large or small down to the same level . This would 
6u . S . Department of State , The United States and the Peace , 
(Washington : U. S . Government Printin Office, 1945), p . 25 . 
7rbid ., p . 26 . 
8rbid . , p . 4o . 
9Albert P . Nenarokov, Russia in the Tvrentieth Century, (New 
York : William Morrmr & Company, 1968) p . 2t~9 . 
6 
make each nation equal in a military sense because no nation would 
have the power to carry on armed a ression ~ainst its neighbors. 
Hith the fear of a.gression removed, Litvinov said, every nation could 
feel that at last it had become more secure.10 
The fact remains, hm.rever, that the Soviet Union was seeking 
total disarmament in furtherance of her own national security. Soviet 
leaders realized that Russia "'\vas still in a weak position, militarily 
speaking , and these leaders feared collective action on the part of 
other nations. Total disarmament, therefore, would put the Soviet 
Union on the same par "'\vi th other nations in regard to military power. 
This would leave her free to extend the Marxist-Leninist and later 
Stalinist brand of Communism beyond her borders by political and 
economic means without fear of military retaliation. 11 
The Soviet Union, following the withdrawal of Germany from 
the League in 1934, and believing that collective security might be 
the better course because of the failure of the disarmement con-
ferencel2 and believing that active participation in the League would 
be a deterrent to Germany, the mortal enemy of Russia, joined the 
League on September 18, 1934, and was given a seat on the League 
Council.l3 Hith this willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to 
lOMaxim Litvinov, The Soviet ' s Fight for Disarmament (New York: 
International Publishers, 1932), pp . ll-13. 
llRobert Payne, The Rise and Fall of Stalin (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, Avon edition, 1966) p . 589 . 
l2Robert • Slusser and 
of Soviet Treaties, (California : 
p . 262 . 
Jan F. Triska, Theory, Law and Policy 
Stanford University Press, 1962) 
l3Basil Dmytryshyn, A Concise History of the U. S . S .R. , (Ne"'\v 
York: Charles Scribner ' s Sons, 1965, pp . 202-203 . 
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join the League and the willingness of the Communist party to join 
in the Popular Front movements in the Western countries, it becomes 
quite clear that Soviet Russia vas interested in creatin~ a balance 
of pm·rer, institutionalized or otherwise, to be directed a ainst a 
powerful Germany. Soviet Russia was attempting to use the League 
to stop the creation of a balance of paver vrhich might be directed 
against herself, as well. But the balance of power was a~ain shifting 
against Russia ,.,i th the signing of the Four Power Pact of Rome, by 
Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy in the summer of 1933. 14 
The United States State Department recognized this fact when 
it made the statement on May 27, 1933, that the pact was: 
. . • a veiled attempt to complete the undermining of 
League prestige, to eliminate the lesser pavers from their 
increasing importance in the councils of Europe, and 
to establish a sort of Directorate of Four, in which 
France, deprived of her eastern alliances, and with Russia 
strictly excluded, would be in a minority of one, while 
Britain ' s chronic vacillation •rould make of Italy the 
finger on the balance of European power . l5 
This pact vas, in effect, the forerunner of the Munich Confer-
ence vhich eventually led to World War II~6 Several conclusions should 
have been dravrn by Soviet Russia from the signin o this pact, which 
was never ratified . The Soviet Union should have realized that the 
Western European pmrers were still interested in seeing a balance of 
power created vrhich would contain the U. S .S .R. She should also have 
seen that the principle of equality of all nations , •rhile true in 
l4Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, (Chicago: 
Rand McNally Company, 1966) , p . 312-313 . 
15Morgenthau, p . 76 . 
l6winston S . Churchill, The Gathering Storm, (Cambridge : 
Houghton 1ifflin Company, 1948), p . 279-280. 
8 
theory , was never true in fact , and peace and security depended upon 
a coalition of the great owers who alone were in the uosition to keep 
the peace . 
Soviet leaders, however , still attempted to use the League 
as a basis for building a balance of ower directed against Germany . 
The Hunich Conference , however , made the Russian leaders r ealize at 
last that the .Jestern pmrers were either too weak to stop Hitler or 
vrere planning again to form a Directorate of Four against Russia .17 
The U. S .S .R. consequently began to act unilater ally in order to gain 
mor e time t o prepar e its own defenses and t o gain buffer ter ri t or ies 
betvreen the U. S .S .R. and Germany .18 
In t he event of a Eur opean vrar, Soviet strat egi s t s saw tvro 
alter natives fo r the Soviet Union : a •rar agai nst Germany i n ••hich the 
Sovi et Uni on would be allied •ri th the West or a •rar between Germany 
and t he West i n which the Soviet Union vrould be neutral .19 As Soviet 
Rus s i a doubted t he YTi l l ingness of the Western power s t o enter i nt o an 
effe ct i ve alli ance with t he Soviet gove r nment , Soviet strategists 
chose t he second alternative : neutral status t h r ough an agreement 
with Naz i Germany . 
17Albert Z. Carr, Truman, Stalin and Peace (New York : Double-
day and Company , 1950), p . 124; James F . Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 
(New York : Har per Brothers, 1947) p . 283 . 
l8August Rei, The Nazi-Soviet Conspiracy and the Baltic States : 
Diplomatic and Other Evidences (London: Boreas Publishin , 1948 ), 
p. 9 ; Alfred Bilmanis, A History of Litvia (Ne•r J ersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1951), p . 388 . 
19c 123 . arr, p . 
-- --- - -
9 
The Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed on August 23, 1939. The 
pact contained a secret protocol assigning to each Party "spheres of 
20 influence" in the Baltic, Finland, and Poland. When the war in Europe 
finally broke out, Russia moved against Poland and proceeded to occupy 
h f . fl 21 her s p ere o ~n uence. Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States 
of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was all but complete by 1940. 22 
Soviet attempts to bring Finland under control, however, were 
not successful. In the winter of 1939 the U.S.S.R. declared war on 
Finland. 23 For her actions against Finland the Soviet Union was branded 
an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. 24 This action was 
considered by Moscow as further proof that the Western world vTas still 
seeking to create a bloc of nations directed against the U.S.S.R. 
Pre-United Nations attitudes. -- When the German attack on 
Soviet Russia did come, the Soviet leaders were quite willing to join 
hands with Great Britain and the United States in order to defeat the 
20 
Dmytryshyn, p. 207; Slusser and Triska, Theory, Law and 
Policy, p. 256. 
21Rei, p. 17; U. S. Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations: 
1939-1941, ed. Raymond Sontag and James Beddie (New York: Didier, 
Publishers, 1948), p. 95. 
22 
John A. Armstrong, Ideology, Politics and Government in the 
Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 123. 
23Alter Brody, et al, War and Peace in Finland: A Documental 
Survey (New York: Soviet Russia Today, 1940), p. 123; Finland Reveals 
Her Secret Documents on Soviet Folic March 1940-June 1941, {official 
Blue-White Book of Finland , p. 
24Dmytryshyn, p. 213; David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign 
Policy, 1939-1942 (Ne,·T Haven, Yale University Press, 1942), p . 151. 
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Gernans . For this reason the U. S .S .R. sou ht and obtained lend- lease 
agreements with the United States . 25 These agreements the Soviets con-
ceded , would serve world peace and would aid Russia to preserve her 
national security . The Russians aereed also with the idea that 
Lend- Lease was a foundation stone for a future world or~anization in an 
exchange of telegrams between Soviet and American leaders on the anni -
versary of the signing of the agreement between the United States 
government and the Soviet overnment in 1943 . 26 Even as far alonP, as the 
Yalta Conference in 1945 Stalin declared this to be a fact . 27 
After the Atlantic Charter was made kno>m to the world, the 
Soviet overnment expressed agreement with its princ iples insofar as 
the Soviet Union was concerned throu h the Soviet ambassador to En land 
in a statement to the Inter-Allied eetin in London, Sentenber 24, 1941 . 
The statement said in part, that consistent application of the prin-
ciples expressed in the Charter would be sought b. Soviet Russia ,28 that 
the Soviet Union would advocate collect i ve security against ag ressors 
as a means of advancing t he peace and security of the world, 29 and that 
the Soviet Union would seek to apply the principles of self- determination 
25Ivan r-taisky , Aen.ories of A Soviet Ambassador, 1939-1943, 
(New York : Charles Scribner ' s Sons , 1968 ), ~ · 193; Stanley S . Jados, 
Documents on Russian- Amer i can Relat i ons (l~ashington , D.C. Catholic 
Uni versi t y Press, 1965 ), pp . 94- 95 , 97-98 . 
26Andre,·T Rothstein, Soviet. Poli cy Dur i ng the Great Patriotic 
\Tar (Ne,., York : Hutchins on and Company, 1946 ) , I , pp . 224-225 , p . 231. 
27Edwar d Stett i nius , Roosevelt and t he Rus sians (New Yor k : 
Doubleday , 1949 ), . 220 . 
28u .s. Department of St ate , Pos t>Var Fore i gn Policy Preparation 
1939-1945 (Washin ton: U. S . Government Pr i nting Offi ce , 1949 ) , p . 13 . 
29Roths t e in, I , p . 97 . 
and the sovereign rights of nations in its search for peace and 
•t 30 secur1 y. These principles were adhered to by Soviet Russia in 
several speeches by Stalin, to the peoples of the U.S.S.R. 31 and in 
various treaties signed by the Soviet government at this time. 32 
When the Soviet leaders set their hands to such documents 
affirming the principles of the Atlantic Charter , 33 the Soviet Union 
became a part of the Grand Alliance through which she realized two 
11 
objectives . Her primary objective at this time was to seek the quickest 
means for driving the German invader from her soil. The second objec-
tive was to have herself recognized as a power on a par with the United 
States so as to have an equal say in the postwar settlements. 34 With 
such equality then, the U.S.S . R. could safeguard her own security while 
advancing her national interests. 
By becoming a member of the Grand Alliance the Soviet Union 
was at last able to realize the long-term objectives she had sought 
from the twenties. The U.S.S.R. had sought to become an equal of the 
United States and to be recognized as such. For this reason the 
U. S . S . R. had entered the League of Nations and had argued so steadfastly 
for total disarmament. The Soviet Union had sought to keep aggressor 
nations away from her borders. For this reason she entered into vari-
ous non-agression pacts. The So-viet Union also sought to maintain and 
extend her spheres of influence without fear of retaliation on the 
30The United States and the Peace, p . 41. 
31Ibid. 
32Ibid. 
33 Jados, Documents , p. 87. 
34 Nenarokov , p. 250. 
12 
part of other nations. For this reason the U.S .S.R. had proposed total 
nilitary disarmaMent, ained a seat on the League Council, taken over 
her Baltic neighbors, and signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 which 
split eastern Europe into two spheres of influence. 
Post-World War I Concepts and Attitudes of the 
United States 
American concepts and attitudes in the Twenties and early 
Thirties . --The United States, too, felt that she had gained nothin 
from participation in the war, a war which was not to Make the world 
safe for democracy, but a •rar which •ras only to further the interests 
of her former allies . She felt that she had gained nothing from the 
war but a huge amount of indebtedness on the part of her former allies 
and that these debts would never be paid . Coupled with this feeling 
was the feeling of "Back to Normalcy" . To use Calvin Coolidge's ex-
pression, "America ' s business was business" . The United States began 
to pursue a "live alone and like it" policy . 35 
The policies of the United States government became very evi-
dent in its attitude toward the League . Warren Harding exnressed the 
vievrpoint of the Administration 1-rhen he said that the League would 
cause the United States overnment to surrender to a dan erous extent 
its independence of action, if the United Nations joined the League . 36 
There vrere, however, quite a number of Republican leaders includin 
Herber t Hoover who disagreed •ri th Administration policy, and said that 
35 arquis Childs and ·lilliam Stone, Toward a Dynamic America 
( Iew York : Foreign Policy Association, 19lf3) p . 16 . 
36Ruhl Bartlett , The Record of American Diplomacy (New York : 
Alfr ed Knopf , 1947) , p . 481 . 
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the United States should join some sort of vrorld orp-anization . 37 
Other Republican leaders, in the ''Statement of 31", said that the 
United States should join the League, but believed in making changes 
in the League for the preservation of United States rights .38 Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Senior, believed the United States should join an or~ani-
zation composed of nations whose vital interests were in the zones of 
the !forth Atlantic or that the United. States should ,join in alliance 
with Great Britain and France in order to protect those vital 
interests . ?9 
It vras for this purpose that the Lod e reservation, Article 2 
of vrhich said that the United States should have no obli at ion to 
preserve the territorial intesrity or political independ.ence of any 
nation, nor to interfere in controversies bet•reen nations, nor to em-
ploy military or naval forces without the consent of Con ress , and 
Article 4 of which said , that the United States should have the right 
to judge vrhat questions of security were to remain within United States 
jurisdiction, lrere introduced into the Senate . 40 But, due to Hilson's 
desire for a universal or anization, Lodge ' s desire or a li~ited 
organization or an alliance, and the isolationists' desire for no 
United States participation in any sort of organization, both the League 
and the Lodge resolutions were rejected by the Senate . 41 The period 
of the twenties became one in which Charles Evans Hu hes, Secretary of 




41Bar lett , pp . 470- 471 . 
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State for Harding, refused to answer any and all correspondence from the 
League and one in which United States observers at Geneva were instructed 
not to enter any building under League authority.42 The attitude, 
therefore, in the United States was that the country should follow 
the advice of its first president and avoid entangling alliances which, 
in the long run, would be detrimental to the best interests of the 
United States. 
American action in conjunction with the League of Nations. --
The attitude of the United States government changed slightly in the late 
twenties and early thirties for although the United States did not join 
the League and the government maintained its former position in regard 
to it, the United States government did send various representatives to 
join in conferences when the national interests were involved. The 
United States sponsored the Washington Conference of 1922, took part in 
the London Naval Conference of 1930, signed the Kellogg-Briand Peace 
Pact, promulgated the Moratorium for the payment of international debts 
in 1930, and implemented League action in regard to the Japanese inva-
sion of Manchuria in 1931 . 43 The United States official attitude, 
however, continued to be one of smugness and "to the devil with Europe". 
Governmental policy was best expressed in a statement made in Cleveland 
by the Under-Secretary of State, William R. Castle, October 27, 1932. 
"We have always to think of just one thing - what is the interest of 
the United States. " 44 The United States at this time felt that she 
42Thomas Bailey , A Diplomatic History of the American People 
(New York: Appleton-Century, 1946), p. 481. 
43John A. Krout, United States since 1865 (New York: Barnes 
and Noble, Inc., 1958), pp. 185-188. 
44william R. Castle, Press Releases No. 391 (Washington: u. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1932). 
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could still act alone in the maintenance of her national 
security. 
Uevr International cooperation . -- It became increasingly 
evident to the nevr Roosevelt administration, hm.,rcver, that the best 
course of American policy lay in international cooperation, in the 
best interests of American security rather than in isolationism . 
This cooperation was to be only regional in scope, hovrever, because 
American vital interests, for the Most part, lay within the t!estern 
Hemisphere . 'rhis cooperation was to be nainly for the stren then-
ing of the Monroe Doctrine . In Decenber, 1936, the principle that 
an act of disturbing the peace of any one American republic affected 
all the American republics was subscribed to by the United States 
government delegate at the Pan-American Conference . 1l5 President 
Roosevelt tried to broaden this principle in his famous "Q,uarantine 
Speech" of 193746 and in a radio address on September 3, 1939, the 
date of the opening of the second world war.47 
It must not be supposed, however that the United States in 
the early period of the Roosevelt administration uas willing or ready 
to join an international orga.nization ,.,hich would eopardize its free-
dom of action . Cordell Hull, the American Secretary o State, made 
this quite clear in a radio address delivered at Washin~ton, 
Narch 17, 1938 . 48 America was still not ready to take an active part 
in suppressing acts of aggressor nations vThich threatened the peace and 
security of the entire vrorld . 
45Postwar Forei~n Policy Preparation, p . 13 . 
46Bartlett, p . 577 . 
47Postvrar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 16 . 
48 U.S . Department of State , P::.....::.e~a:..:.c...:e--:an.;;;_d_v_la-'r __ : _..:...:..:Un-'i_t:..;.e_d_S_t_a,..,tr-e::-s, 
Foreign Policy (vlashington, U. S . Government Printin~ Office , 1942) , 
pp. 407-419 . 
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Effects of German expension and aggression . Hhile America 
during this period uas pursuing a policy of cooperation without action, 
affairs in Europe vrere dravring to a clinax . Germany and Italy had be-
gun their march and the Western democracies pursued a policy of 
appeasement . Germany marched into the Rhineland and Austria, and 
Italy into Ethic ia . 49 The policy of collective security was no longer 
considered to be in force by the Western democracies as they pursued 
their policy of appeasement . Appeasement reached its zenith at Munich 
in the fall of 1938 . 5° The Western powers , still believing that Hitler 
vrould maintain the status quo after his demands on Czechoslovakia were 
achieved , and still believing that he would be a vital factor in the 
creation of a balance of povrer against Soviet Russia , all01-1ed Hitler 
to carr y out his dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in order to gain 
''peace in our time" . 51 
It was only in the summer of 1940 vTi th the fall of' the 101·1-
lands , Scandinavia , and France that the United States began to realize 
that German aggression threatened both the ·lest ern Hemisnhere and its 
own national security, and that the United States , of necessity , must 
cooperate with the forces arrayed against Hitler . For this reason 
President Roosevelt , by executive agreement, negotiated the transfer 
of fifty old-age destroyers to Britain in return for the right to lease 
naval bases . 52 Althou h the trans er vas consummated in the name of 
49churchill , pp . 268- 271 . 
50Ibid . , p . 3oo . 
51Ibid . , p . 318 
52Krout , U. S . Since 1865 . , p . 211 . 
national defense, it marked the beginning of active cooperation on the 
part of the United States to put down aggression in the world. 
Further aid to those forces resisting German aggression was 
sought by the president when he asked the Congress on January 6 , 1941, 
for quick enactment of a lend-lease program . The president told the 
Congress that the United States was: 
••• committed to full support of all those resolute people, 
everywhere, who are resisting aggression and thereby keeping 
war away from our mm hemisphere. By this support • • • we 
strengthen the defense and security of our own nation.53 
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It was not until March 11, 1941, that Congress passed such an 
act. On the basis of this act, lend-lease agreements were concluded 
with several nations who were fighting against the Germans. The 
"master agreement" signed with Britain served as the model for agree-
ments signed with other countries including the one signed with oscow 
in the summer of 1942. 54 
Although Prime Mi nister Churchill never admitted the fact,55 
the Lend- Lease Agreements promulgated by the United States were a 
foundation stone for the future world organization. When Foreign 
Minister Molotov visited Washington on May 29, 1942, the subject for 
discussion was the lend- lease agreement soon to be signed between his 
government and that of the United States, and how those agreements 
might further the maintenance of peace and security for the freedom-
loving nations after the war.56 Dean Acheson , the Assistant Secretary 
53 6 Bartlett , p. 01. 
54Rothstein , I , pp . 162- 165. 
55Raymond Dennet and Robert Turner , Documents on American 
Foreign Policy (Boston: World Peace Foundation , 1945 -- ) , VIII , p . 839 . 
56Rothstein , I , pp . 166- 167 . 
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of State, in a speech on July 6, 1942, said that the Lend-Lease Agree-
ments were not made by the United States to seek ro it or eturn on 
investment, but were made in the interests of national security. Na-
tional security, he declared, in turn rested on national peace. These 
agreements 1vould serve the peace by enabling the Bi~ Four to work in 
cooperation with one another towards the establishment o a peaceful 
world . 57 
Closely allied with lend-lease as one of the foundations of 
the United Nations Organization was the meeting which took place be-
tween Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt on the Atlantic 
Ocean in the summer of 1941 . At this meeting decisions concerning aid 
to Soviet Russia took place between Churchill and Roosevelt, and a 
telegram was sent to Stalin officially suggesting a meeting on the 
apportionment of joint resources.58 
It was at this Atlantic meeting that the Atlantic Charter was 
drawn up . This Charter contained the "Four Freedoms", the ori inal 
foundation of the United Nations . 59 This conference although it was 
held for the primary purpose of coordinating American defense efforts 
in the Hestern Hemisphere with British defense efforts on the con-
tinent of Europe, was the forerunner for the various meetings to be 
held between the leaders of the United States and the other governments 
of the United Nations for the purpose of seeking ways and means to 
57Holborn, I, 97 . 
58Postwar Foreign Policy , p . 49 . On this suggestion a meetin _ 
took place between the representatives of the Big Three the following 
September . 
59Henry Littlefield, New Outline-History of Europe 1815- 1942 
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1942), p. 259. 
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defeat the Axis nations and for the purpose of promoting plans for an 
international organization for the maintenance of peace and security. 
Continued American adherence to the Atlantic Charter as the 
guiding objective of the United States in all postwar settlements was 
g iven by the president on December 21, 1944, when he declared, "The 
Atlantic Charter is just as valid today as when it was pronounced in 
1941.1160 
It becomes evident, therefore, that both the United States and 
the Soviet Union were in full accord with the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter, but for different reasons. The United States be-
lieved that promulgation of such principles on its part would aid the 
future peace and security of the world, as not only England but the 
smaller nations of the world would come to realize that the United 
States had their interests at heart. Common interests would lead to 
common security. Common security would lead to a common international 
organization. 
Summation of Soviet and American Security Objectives 
in the Twenties and Thirties 
Soviet objectives. -- This examination of the foreign policies 
of the United States and the Soviet Union during the twenties and thir-
ties has shown the principle security objectives of both countries. 
To some extent the future objectives of both of these countries have 
also been shown. Past Soviet objectives are the same as those of the 
present, and future. The U.S.S.R's primary objective was to halt 
German aggression by the creation of a balance of power, institutiona-
lized or otherwise. The Soviet Union's other main objectives were to 
6o 
Dennet and Turner, VI, 287. 
become an equal of the United States, and to expand the influence of 
Communism throughout the world without fear of retaliation from other 
nations. 
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American objectives. -- The prime objective of the United States 
in this period was to stop all aggression which threatened the vital 
interests in the North Atlantic area. Co-terminous with this objective 
was the objective of protecting the Western Hemisphere from attack . 
America in this period was not willing to enter into entangling al-
liances which might have affected its sovereignty or its freedom of 
action in the international sphere. For the future, the first two 
objectives remained the same , but due to the heavy naval losses of 
Britain during World War II , America found herself taking on added res-
ponsibilities. The United States has increasingly had to fill the gap 
left by the power vacuum in Western Europe after World War II. The 
United States then of necessity has had to enter into various organiza-
tions and alliances , the most important organization being the United 
Nations. 
CHAPTER II 
CONFERENCES AND PLANS FOR WORLD ORGANIZATION 
JULY, 1943- JANUARY, 1945 
Foundation Stones for World Organization 
The Moscow Conference -- It was this search for security on 
the part of the Soviet Union and the United States which led to the 
Moscow and Teheran Conferences of the Big Three in 1943. Stalin was 
interested in an alliance of the Big Three in order to find and keep 
the peace and to further his own ideas of national security. 1 Roosevelt 
and Churchill felt that the establishment of a world organization would 
be for their own best interests because the common interests of most of 
the nations of the world would be in accord with their own interests. 
In this way the two great 1-lestern powers felt they could achieve 
national security. 
The Moscow Conference marked a turning point for the United 
States, Great Britain, and Russia for it was the first time the Grand 
Alliance became institutionalized. 2 It was at this conference that 
these three countries agreed that Big Three unanimity which was a re-
ality in the war must be continued into the postwar world so that each 
nation could reach its objectives in concert with the other two and yet 
not be hampered by restrictions on national sovereignty. These leaders , 
therefore, came to the conclusion that an international organization 





based on the principles of national sovereignty and on the principles 
set forth in the Atlantic Charter must be established. A joint com-
munique to this effect was issued simultaneously by the governments of 
the Big Three on October 30, 1943,3 and in the "Declaration of the 
Four Nations", issued on November 1 , 1943. 4 
The Conference also marked a turning point in the foreign af-
fairs of both the United States and Russia for it was the first time 
that either of these two countries were agreed on the fact that peace 
and security ·depended upon some kind of world organization which required 
their active participation.5 The Declaration also marked a turning point 
in international affairs for, although it recognized the fact that all 
nations both great and small should be members of a world organization, 
it stated the fact that general peace and security depended, for the 
most part, on the joint action of the big powers. 
The Declaration was not just a statement issued by the govern-
ments concerned which could be ignored at a later date. This, at least, 
was the opinion of the United States government for it proposed on 
November 18, 1943, if the other governments approved, that the four 
parties to the Moscow Declaration would welcome all peace-loving states 
to the establishment of a general international organization. This 
proposal received the approval of the Russian government only, but in 
3Rothstein, II, p. 241 
4u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States : Conferences at Cairo and Yalta, 1943, p . 387; The United 
States and the Peace, pp. 5-7 . 
5Ibid. 
November, 1943, the British gave oral consent to the suggestion by 
asking the State Department about methods of procedure in setting up 
a world organization.6 
Teheran . -- At Teheran the leaders of the Big Three met in 
November, 1943 to discuss methods of peace . Again it was stated that 
there should be a general international organization which would 
prevent the outbreak of such wars as were being waged while the 
conference was in session. 7 No commitments were made by any of the 
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three leaders at this time, in the realm of world politics and organi-
zation,8 although both Roosevelt and Stalin had discussed in general 
terms the type of organization to be erected. 
Roosevelt's conception of an international organization was 
that it should be composed of three main bodies. The first body was 
to be an Assembly of all the members of the United Nations from all 
over the world. The second body was to be the Executive Committee 
consisting of the Big Four plus the representatives of two European 
nations, one South American nation, one Middle Eastern nation, one Far 
Eastern nation, and one British dominion. This executive committee 
would deal with all non-military questions. The third body, as set 
forth by Roosevelt, was to be the "Four Policemen" which was to be 
6u.s. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 
1939-1945. (Washington: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1949), 
pp. 246-247. 
7James P. Warburg, Foreign Policy Begins at Home (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, 1944), p. 211. 
~ostwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 200. 
~----------------------------- ------------------ - -- -
the enforcing agency. The United States was to provide only naval 
and air forces for that agency.9 
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By Stalin's questioning, following Roosevelt's explanation , 
it can be seen that Stalin was vitally interested as to whether 
decisions of the executive body would be binding, and that he regarded 
the European area as vitally important, more so than Asia.lO 
There seems to have been no discussion between the two 
leaders as to the possibility that an aggressor nation might be one 
of the Big Four. 
Roosevelt returned to this country and in his "State of the 
Union" message of January, 1944, made it clear to the Congress that 
national security was his main concern at both the Moscow and the 
Teheran Conferences: 
The one supreme objective for the future, which we 
discussed for each nation individually and for all the 
United Nations, can be summed up in the one word: Security. 
And that means not only physical security, which pro-
vides safety from attack by aggressors, but also means econ-
omic securitl, social security, and moral security--in a family 
of nations .1 
With the end of these conferences, the underlying ideas of 
the future United Nations Organization had been formed. The United 
Nations Declaration of January, 1942, formed the wartime coalition of 
the great powers . The Moscow Conference made it clear t hat the 
great powers thought it necessary to establish a world organization . 
9Robert E . Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: 
Harper Brothers, 1948), p . 785; U. S. Dept . of State, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1943, pp . 530-531. 
lOsherwood, pp . 785-786. 
llHolborn, p . 259. 
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At Teheran it was realized that it was the responsibility of the 
Big Four, in particular, and of all the United Nations to make the 
peace. 12 
When it became evident that the Big Four were agreed on the 
idea of a general international organization, it was imperative that 
preparation should be made and plans drawn up by the various leaders, 
embodying their ideas on the function and organization of such a body. 
The groundwork for a definite international organization 
with active participation on the part of the United States had al-
ready been laid before the Moscow Conference. On September 1 , 1943, 
a conference of Republican leaders at Mackinac Island, Michigan, 
endorsed United States participation in a postwar world organization. 13 
This endorsement was translated into legislative action on the part of 
Congress with the passage of the Fulbright resolution1 4 on 
September 21, 1943, and the passage of the Connally resolution15 on 
November 5, 1943 . 
Plans for World Organization 
United States plans. -- Both the United States and Russia were 
working on plans for a world organization in this period. The United 
States had presented five plans to either the president or 
l2Leland Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United 
Nations (2d ed.; Boston : World Peace Foundation, 1949), pp. 4-5 . 
13Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 196. 
14The United States and the Peace , p. 5. 
15rbid., p . 8 
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the secretary of state in the period extending from July 14, 1943 to 
July 18, 1944 . 16 
The absolute ~principle, that is, the principle of allow-
ing one permanent member to cast a negative vote to halt action, on 
all matters concerning enforcement action and on all matters of pacific 
settlement was contained in only one plan, that of July 14, 1943 . 17 
The absolute protective veto principle , that is , the principle of 
allowing one permanent member to cast a negative vote on all enforce-
ment matters in order to protect that nation's sovereignty on the use 
of its troops, to protect that nation's sovereignty in matters of 
domesti c jurisdiction, to protect that nation's satellites, was 
included in all the other plans . Provision was made in all the other 
plans that abstaining members were to be obligated by the majority 
decision. 18 In the December 29 plan the vote of a party on the Council 
and involved in a dispute was not to be counted .19 In the July 18 , 1944, 
plan provisions were to be made later in case one or more of the per-
manent members was a party to a dispute.20 
All of these plans recognized that the Big Four must be 
unanimous in decisions relating to the determination of threats to the 
peace, terms of settlement for disputes in which they w·ere not in-
volved, measures of enforcement, regulation of armaments, and, in the 
16Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 473. 
17Ibid., p . 473. 
18Ibid. , PP· 473-495 . 
19Ibid . , p . 534 . 
20ibid . , P· 595 . 
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last analysis, >There sovereignty was to lie. All of these plans 
recognized the right of veto on these matters as a prerogative of the 
great powers. 
These plans showed the world that the United States was still 
fearful for its own peace, security, and sovereignty, but that the 
United States was willing to join an international organization which 
would not circumscribe her sovereignty and security. These plans did 
show the world that the United States was more willing than was the 
Soviet Union to allow the international organization to make decisions 
to which she could subscribe without a loss of freedom of action . 
Four of these plans did limit the unanimity principle to the extent 
that an abstaining power would be bound by the decision of the other 
members of the Council. 
Soviet plans . -- The Russians, too, were interested in plans 
for an international organization. But they desired an international 
organization constructed in such a manner as would allow them to re-
tain their national sovereignty and independence of action in 
international and domestic affairs. 
The Soviet Union had stated her desire to join an international 
organization as early as 1942.21 But it was not until after the Dum-
barton Oaks Conversations, which left unsettled the question of voting, 
that the Russians began to set forth ideas on exactly what their plans 
for a world organization might be . As Joseph Stalin said in a speech 
to the Russian people on November 6, 1944, security was the main pro-
blem for the Russian leaders.22 
21Holborn , I, p. 365; United States Department of State , 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943 , I, p . 1050 . 
22Rothstein , II, pp. 31- 32. 
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This speech set the pattern for more elaborate plans which 
appeared in various official organs of the Russian government . The 
Soviet leaders were primarily concerned with creating an organization 
whose prime purpose would be to obviate the recurrence of German ag-
gression with a view to avoiding the mistakes of the Allies following 
the first vrorld vrar. The future organization must be built on the 
agreement , unanimity, and close cooperation of the great powers of the 
t . G 1·t · 23 an ~- erman coa ~ ~on. Several articles made it abundantly clear 
that the Soviet Union would not participate in any international organi-
zation patterned after the defunct League , the reason being that the 
Soviet Union would not agree to join an international organization 
which could later be used against her, as was the case in the League. 
One Soviet writer proposed that in the future world organi-
zation the leading and decisive role be played by the big powers 
who would assume active leadership, and who would form the central 
element of the organization. These great powers, this writer continued, 
must assume the obligation to resist aggression, if necessary , with 
their armed forces alone, irrespective of the attitudes of the other 
members of the organization. This, of course, meant that the responsi-
bility for maintaining peace would rest not within an impersonal 
organization or with fifty or sixty nations, but would rest within an 
organization headed by a league of the great powers. Such a league 
would, of necessity, in matters concerning the direction of the organi-
zation , and in matters of important nature, mean unanimity among the 
members of the league . In order to put their decisions into effect, it 
23Rothstein , II, pp. 31-32. 
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was this writer ' s opinion that these countries ought to be given, in a 
constitutional fashion, formal authority appropriate to their real and 
de facto obligations. 24 This writer felt that aggression must be 
stopped in the shortest possible time, but he did not favor big, 
independent armies . The best way to stop aggression, he stated, was 
to have an air force which could be under international control . 25 
This same writer went on to say that the Soviets did not agree 
to the principle of unanimity in the League of ations because what 
was thought to be unanimity was , in reality, a lack of it . One nation 
could stop any action to be taken on the part of the League, no matter 
what was the size of that nation . Big Five unanimity would be dif-
ferent because they would have a common purpose and interests, because 
they would act quickly in an emergency, and would not be stopped in 
their actions by a vote of a small power.26 
Another writer of the Soviet Union maintained the principle of 
unanimity and accord between the great powers was necessary because 
they alone possessed the resources to keep the peace . In any future 
organization, however, the principle of national sovereignty must be 
maintained and a permanent member must , therefore , be allowed to vote 
on questions concerning that nation ' s self- interest. This writer 
maintained further that Soviet juristic thought had always paid more 
24charles Prince, "Current Views of the Soviet Union on the 
International Organization of Security, Cooperation, and International 
Law", AJIL, 39, September, 1945, pp . 452-453 . 
25Ibid . , p . 453 . 
26Ibid., p . 453 . 
attention to geopolitics and economics, rather than law, and that 
the Soviet validated all its actions on these grounds . 27 
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The Soviet Union could not depend upon the fiction of 
"legality" in any future organization because some nations who might 
become members of that organization might be nations who refused to 
recognize or would refuse to recognize the Soviet Union . If this were 
the case, the Soviet Union could see no reason why she could rely on 
the impartiality of "decisions" of these nations . 28 
It becomes obvious that the Soviet Union was interested in 
only some of the same concepts for a world organization which inter-
ested the United States . The Soviet leaders were interested in joint 
cooperation and unanimity among the great powers as a deterrent to 
future German aggression, but Stalin recognized the importance of 
keeping Russian national interests protected and for this reason de-
manded the absolute veto on matters vitally affecting these interests. 
Soviet concepts were different from American concepts in 
regard to the type of organization to be established . vfuereas the 
Americans desired an organization in which the small powers would be 
included and would have some function in the maintenance of world 
peace , t he Soviet leaders felt that the world organization should be 
controlled by the big powers , and the smaller nations should accept 
without question the authority of those powers. 29 
27Ibid ., p . 455 . 
28Ibid . , P . 458 . 
29Jados, Documents , p. 145. 
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It was a known fact that the Russians vehemently opposed any 
such plan which would not allow the great powers to completely domi-
nate the new organization, and although the Soviets were careful to 
safeguard their own sovereignty, they did not want the lesser powers 
to exercise their sovereignty to such an extent that a great bloc of 
national votes could be used against them. 3° For this reason they 
could not agree to any voting plan on a straight national basis which 
might put the Soviet Union in the minority. 
They agreed, however, with the United States that this 
association of big powers would be intrusted not only with efforts to 
achieve a peace over the common foe, but would also be intrusted with 
the establishment of a just and lasting peace, and the establishment of 
economic, political and cultural cooperation among nations. 
Dumbarton Oaks 
Agreement on absolute protective veto on enforcement measures.--
The United States and the Soviet Union were in agreement on most of the 
purposes , functions, and obligations of the proposed organization. Be-
cause of this, and because the American proposals were most complete , 
both the Soviets and the British accepted the American position as the 
basis for discussion at Dumbarton Oaks near Washington, D.c . 31 
None of the four major powers was willing to accept at Dumbarton 
Oaks the straight majority vote on substantive questions, for such a 
30~., p. 146. 
3lPostwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 315; Krout, p. 233. 
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vote would mean that the armed forces of any nation could be used 
without its consent, that decisions could be reached which would ad-
versely affect one of the great powers without its consent, and that 
economic sanctions could be applied against one of the great powers or 
its satellites without that power's consent.32 
Disagreement on abstention . -- The disagreement between the 
Russians and Americans revolved around the question of whether members 
of the Security Council that were parties to a dispute, including dis-
putes involving the use of sanctions, including the parties that were 
major nations with permanent membership on the Council, would have the 
right to vote or to be required to abstain from voting in decisions by 
the Council on the dispute . 33 This question was fundamental to the 
rights and obligations of members in the organization, and to the basic 
principles on which the organization would fUnction . 
The British came to Dumbarton Oaks with the view that the votes 
of any party to any dispute would not be taken into account, as was the 
case in all matters in the League . The American position was that a 
permanent member, like a non- permanent, should not vote in connection 
w·i th any dispute to which it was a party. The Soviet representatives 
held the contrary view for they felt that, on any matter concerning 
their vital interests, they should be able to protect those interests 
at all costs . 34 
32J ados , p . 146; Richard Ttl. Leopold, The Growth of American 
Foreign Policy, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Publisher, 1962), p . 624. 
33Jados, p . 150; U. S . Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States , 1945, p . 302-303. 
34Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 317 . 
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It became increasingly evident throughout the Dumbarton Oaks 
discussions that this question would not or could not be resolved . 
Recognition of such a right as reserved by the Soviets would , in ef·-
feet, signify an absolute veto by a major power that was a party in 
such a matter . Soviet insistence that the right of absolute veto be 
kept by the major powers in such cases was voiced from the start of 
the matter's consideration and when it continued unmodified, Secretary 
of State Hull discussed the matter with the Soviet representative, 
Andrei Gromyko, without avail. 
Gromyko, while informed by Roosevelt that the United States 
would agree to a simple majority of the eleven members of the Council 
on matters of procedure , was also informed that the American people 
would never agree to the great powers possessing an absolute veto as 
demanded by the Russians, for it was the American concept of justice 
that a litigant should never be able to decide his own case. Gromyko 
was also informed that the smaller nations would never agree to the 
Russian proposal. Gromyko remained adamant in his viewpoint in re-
gard to the absolute veto.35 
Roosevelt, on the advice of Hull, sent Stalin a cablegram 
expressing the American viewpoint. Stalin replied negatively to the 
cablegram, saying that he believed in the unanimity of the great powers 
in all matters. He did say that he would not object to an effort 
to work out a special formula for disputes not involving sanctions. 36 
35stettinius, pp. 20-22 .; Leopold , p. 628 . 
36stettinius, p. 17. (Such a formula was later worked out by 
the State Department and sent to Churchill and Stalin December 5, 1944, 
and later agreed upon at Yalta.); Jados, Documents, p. 150. 
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When Andrei Gromyko stated his government ' s final position , it 
posed the question whether to continue the Conversations in an effort 
to resolve the issue . The United States offered one last compromise 
proposal but even this was rejected by the Soviet representative . 37 
On the 17th of September after a conference with Hull, Stettinius 
talked with Gromyko to get a change of position. He also talked with 
Alexander Cadogan, the British representative, about the whole affair, 
but the Soviet representative remained firm . 38 
The Failure of the Voting Question 
Gromyko stated that an agreement by his government on any 
date for a general conference of the United Nations would depend upon 
whether the British and American governments would accept the Soviet 
position on voting in the Security Council, and agreement on the pro-
posal that all Soviet Republics be initial members of the organization . 
On the first of these proposals the explanation was made that the Soviet 
government continued to consider that the principle of unanimity of 
the four great pmrers must be carried out unconditionally; on the 
second , no explanation vras given . 39 It was decided to leave the chap-
ter on voting procedure open for discussion at a later date . 
Even with this vital problem left unsettled , it was felt 
that the Conversations were successful and steps taken in the right 
direction toward the establishment of an international organization . 
37Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p . 324 . 
38rbid . , p . 327 . 
39Ibid ., p. 328. 
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It was thought a certainty that the differences left unsettled at 
Dumbarton Oaks would not remain unsettled. Stalin pointed this out 
when he said, 
"'rhe surprising thing is not that differences exist, but 
that there are so few of them, and, that as a rule, in 
practically every case they are resolved . . . n40 
The conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the 
publication by the participating governments of the "Tentative Pro-
posals for the Establishment of a General International Organization" 
represented the first important step in the implementation of the 
general policy expressed in the Moscow Four Power Declaration, the 
Teheran Conference, and the numerous statements of President Roosevelt 
and Cordell Hull . 
Following the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, the question on 
voting vrhich remained unsettled was fraught with difficulty. The 
representatives of Great Britain and the United St&tes were willing 
to make some concessions to Russia in regard to the voting question, 
but they were not willing to make the concessions that the Soviet 
Union desired . 
Roosevelt, accordingly, sent telegrams on December 5 and 6, 1944, 
to Stalin in the form of a message conveyed through Ambassador Harriman, 
who asked to discuss the voting question with Stalin . The telegram 
suggested an early meeting between the heads of the three governments 
to iron out the difficulties which had arisen . Harriman, however, did 
40
rbid, p . 337 . 
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not get to see Stalin until December 14. Stalin told Harriman that 
he needed more time to study the proposals . 4l 
But even with the announcement of the United States pro-
posal, the sending of the telegram, and the meeting between Harriman 
and Stalin, the Soviets remained adamant . Stalin replied to 
Roosevelt ' s telegram by saying that he saw no possibility of agreeing 
to the proposed formula . 42 
Vandenberg works for organization . -- The rejection by Stalin 
of the proposed voting formula was taken by many to mean a failure, 
before it was even born, of a world organization. Many leaders in the 
United States did not take such a dim view, however . Senator 
Vandenberg declared on January 10 , 1945, during a debate on foreign 
policy in the United States senate that the United States still pro-
posed 
" . . to help create a post- war world on a basis which shall 
stop aggressor s for keeps, and, so far as is humanly possible, 
substitute justice for force among free men . We propose to 
do it primarily for our own sake" 
and that the United States would be willing to join in an "alliance" 
with Britain and Russia for this purpose . He continued in this same 
speech , 
" . . I want a new dignity and a new authority for inter-
national law . I think that American self- interest requires 
it . " 
41~. , p . 381 . ; Jados , p . 152-153; Stettinius, p . 22 . 
42Postwar For eign Policy Preparation , p . 382 . 
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He declared that real self-interest lies in collective security,43 
an idea which the Russians were proclaiming to the world in pre-war 
days. By analyzing these remarks, it can be seen that Vandenberg was 
quite close to the Russian concept of unanimity . It can be seen that 
Vandenberg envisaged the new world organization as a continuation 
of the wartime grand alliance to stop aggression by any country ex-
cepting the Big Five, as the wartime grand alliance had stopped the 
aggression of Germany, Japan, and Italy, by united action. These 
views were not far from the views held by the senior Henry Cabot 
Lodge . 44 By Vandenberg ' s remarks, it can be seen also that he was 
in agreement with the Russian viewpoint in that he felt the interests 
of this country were paramount in setting up any such world organization. 
United States Proposal of January 15, 1945 
on Voting 
When the Administration leaders became certain, because of 
Senator Vandenberg's remarks, that both Republicans and Democrats 
were willing to join in an international organization to safeguard 
American interests and security, they worked all the harder for a solu-
tion to the voting problem. In January , 1945, copies of a paper 
containing the United States' ideas on what should be the substantive 
and procedural decisions on which the Security Council would have to 
vote were given informally to the British and Soviet ambassadors in 
Washington . 
43The United States and the Peace , pp . 30- 31 . 
44samuel Flagg Bemis , The United States as a World Power 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950) , pp. 174-175. 
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~ualified veto in pacific settlement. -- The paper said 
that on an affirmative vote of seven members, including the permanent 
members of the Council would be required , except that in an event a 
permanent member was a party to a dispute or situation before the 
Council, that member should not be allowed to vote in decisions listed 
under " Promotion of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes" . These would 
include questions as to whether a dispute or a situation brought before 
the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is 
likely to threaten the peace, whether the Council should call on the 
parties to settle or adjust the dispute by means of their own choice, 
whether the Council shoulo make recommendations to the parties as to 
methods and procedures of settlement, whether legal aspects of the 
matter before it (the Council) should be referred to the International 
Court, and whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful 
settlement of disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern 
itself with the controversy . 45 
ew role of enforcement agencies . -- This proposal •ras dif-
ferent from the earlier United States proposals in that the earlier 
proposals took no account of other existing agencies which could be 
used to settle disputes by peaceful means . 
Absolute protective veto on substantive matters . -- On all 
other substantive matters not dealing with pacific settlement absolute 
unanimity would be required among the permanent members .
46 
45postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p . 654 . ; U. S . Department 
of State , Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, P · 772 . 
46Ibid . 
CHAPTER III 
YALTA PJ D SAl FRANCISCO 
The Yalta Conference 
Conference arrangements. -- It was important that some avenue 
of compromise was left open, and the suggestion was made and agreed 
upon that the leaders of the Big Three get together and discuss the 
problem of voting, along with other wartime problems , at Yalta . 
The leaders in all three countries were positive that an 
organization which would place in the hands of the Grand Alliance 
ultimate powers of peace and security must come into being if only to 
safeguard their own national interests and security. These leaders, 
therefore, were willing to go to great lengths to work out these 
problems on the highest level. 
It was perhaps this feeling of common necessity that the 
Yalta Conference marked the high tide of British, Soviet, and American 
cooperation on the war and postwar settlements. 1 The leaders of the 
three countries were sure that the deadlock on the voting problem 
could be broken at Yalta because the conference constituted a stage 
of discussion on the highest policy level while the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conversations constituted a stage of decisions on the highest tech-
nical level. 2 
1stettinius, p . 4. 
2Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 393. 
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The surprising thing is that, although the conference was 
of such an jmportant nature, there is no single official record of 
the meetings . The Soviets, who made all the arrangements for the 
conference, felt that pressure would not be applied to the policy 
makers if such a record was not kept. They also felt a more friendly 
feeling might prevail both during the conference and afterwards if 
words that were uttered in haste at the conference were not taken down 
verbatim. The only reliable source as to what took place at the 
conference comes from those men who were at the conference, took notes, 
and later wrote about the conference.3 
The only full-length discussion of the voting problem took 
place on February 6, 1945 , in Livadia Palace . It was at this meeting 
that Secretary of State Stettinius gave an explanation to the three 
leaders of the proposed voting formula which had been sent to the 
three ambassadors of those countries the preceding December . 4 
Basic conceptual differences . -- Both Roosevelt and Stalin 
had made clear their positions on the matter of voting and on the 
matte r of world organization in general. Their positions had been 
made quite clear long before the Yalta Conference by plans, speeches, 
statements, and documents put forward by themselves and their as-
sociates. Roosevelt thought the most important thing was to keep 
the unity of the great powers for the purpose of defeating Germany and 
then to get the great powers around a conference table to work out a 
3stettinius, p . 104. 
4Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 395 . ; U. S. Department 
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p . 735. 
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world organization which would grant to these powers the major part 
in keeping the peace, but which at the same time would give the small 
nations some voice in their destiny.5 The American concepts would 
have placed a limitation on the great powers' use of the veto in 
matters of pacific settlement. 
The Soviets were of a mind that unanimity among the great 
powers should be kept both during and after the war so that a recur-
rence of aggression on the part of Germany or any other nation, 
excluding the Big Four, which might desire to pursue the same course 
would not be possible . 'l'o this extent, the Russians agreed with the 
American viewpoint. But the Soviet Union deviated from the American 
viewpoint on the type of world organization to be set up. The U.S.S.R . 
was primarily concerned with a world organization which would be run 
solely by the big powers. It was because of this basic difference 
in concepts that no solution thus far had been worked out on the 
voting problem . 
Even at Yalta, the basic differen_ce in concepts was shown 
by the statement of the various leaders. Joseph Stalin made it quite 
clear that the three great powers which had borne the brunt of the 
war should be the ones to preserve the peace . He said it was ridicu-
lous that the small powers should have the same voice as the Big 
Three . He was prepared , he declared, to join with the United States 
and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers, but 
he would never agree to having any action of the Big Powers submitted 
to the judgment of the small powers . 
5stettinius , p. 188 . 
"Yugoslavia, Albania, and such small countries do not 
deserve to be at this table . . . We three have to decide 
how to keep the peace of the world, and it will not be 
kept unless we three decide to do it . "6 
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Presentation of the American viewpoint. The American Posi-
tion on Voting was read at the Third Formal Meeting of the Yalta 
Conference . 7 The American viewpoint stated that there should be 
absolute unanimity among the great powers on enforcement measures 
for the preservation of peace with a provision for a fair hearing for 
all members of the Organization . It was the viewpoint of the United 
States that on pacific settlements of disputes, a qualified voting 
system be used, so as not to block investigation of such a dispute 
in the Council . It was held that these proposals provided a reason-
able, solution to the whole problem , at the same time combining in 
a satisfactory manner the basic concepts8 of the United States leaders 
and its people.9 
It may be argued that the principle of the absolute protective 
veto as set forth in the American proposal was contrary to American 
standards of justice, but Roosevelt, remembering Wilson's troubles 
with the Senate in regard to the League, and keeping in mind that the 
Charter would eventually be submitted to the Senate for ratification, 
was particularly conscious of the importance of this type of veto 
6Ibid ., p. 112.; u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
The United States 2 1943, p . 589 . 
7Appendix I. 
Bstettinius , P· 142. 
9Ibid. , p . 196 . ; u . s . Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
The United States 2 1943, p . 662. 
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as a form of insurance against commitment of American forces, and 
as insurance that American sovereignty would be protected . 10 
Explanation of effect of the formula. -- At this session of 
the conference Stettinius gave an explanation of the American pro-
posals on decisions of the Security Council. The Secretary explained 
that there were some decisions which would require the affirmative 
votes of the seven members of the Security Council, except that a 
member could not cast its vote in any such decisions that concerned 
disputes to which it was a part . 11 
The idea of the American proposal was that any member that 
was a party to the dispute should abstain from voting on decisions 
relating to that dispute as long as the decisions referred to pacific 
settlement or peaceful adjustment - the qualified veto. On the other 
hand, decisions relating to the determination of the existence of a 
threat to the peace, or a breach of the peace, and decisions to use 
enforcement measures would, in all cases, require the unanimous 
agreement of all the permanent members , even the parties to a dis-
pute - the absolute protective veto. 12 Only procedural matters would 
require a simple majority of any seven members of the Council . 
Soviet adherence to the formula . -- After these explanations 
concerning the American proposal were given the meeting was adjourned 
at the request of Stalin to give the Soviet delegation time to study 
lOsherwood, p. 855; U. S . Department of State, Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States , 1943, p. 803 , 811 . 
11
stettinius, p . 143 . 
12stettinius, p . 45 . ; U.S . Department of State, Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States 2 1943, pp. 943-944 . 
.......................................................... ~~~-------------------------------------------
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t he proposals i n t he light of t he Ame rcan explanation. 13 Stalin 
agr eed to the voting formula as pres ented by t he Americans and agr eed 
with the Americans that their voting formula would indeed keep the 
gr e at powers united.l4 
Concessions Made in Re gard 
to the Voting Formula 
Soviet concession on the qualified veto. -- Stalin's conces-
s ion to America was that he agreed to that part of the voting formula 
in which it was implicit that a major power could not by its veto 
prevent the Council from considering a dispute falling under pacific 
settlement, even though such consideration would advertise the involve-
ment of said power in the dispute .15 Stalin felt that the absolute 
protective veto would thoroughly protect Russia's vital interests. 
This concession on the part of the Soviet Union came about because 
the United States, in another phase of the Yalta Conferences, admitted 
Russia 's traditional position as a Pacific power .16 
American concession on the absolute protective veto. --
America 's concession to Russia was that Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's 
demands for an absolute protective veto. 17 Roosevelt did not regard 
this as a concession to Russia for he thought, as stated before, that 
13Postwar Foreign Policy Prepar ation, p . 395 . 
l4stettinius, p. 171 . 
15sherwood, p. 855 .; U. S . Department of State , Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States , 1943, pp . 966- 968 . 
16sumner Welles , "Roosevelt and the Far East-Part II", 
Harper 's Magazine , 202 (March, 1951), p . 77. 
l7 Sherwood, p . 855 .; Leopold , p . 624 . 
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the American Senate would demand some sort of insurance against 
United States involvement in all sorts of wars in all parts of the 
world , and as insurance that American sovereignty would be protected 
before the Senate would ratify the Charter. 
Reasons for Russian Demands for Membership of the 
Soviet Republics 
Soviet Union demands that its member republics be given 
seats in the proposed world organization was indirectly related to the 
problem of the veto and the principle of unanimity in that it showed 
at an early date that Russia was primarily interested in its own 
national security. Although the Ukraine and Byelorussia were to be 
technically considered independent, 18 these two nations would follow 
Soviet policy in every respect. This would, in effect, give the 
Soviet Union greater bargaining power in the Security Council, if 
either of these two nations were elected to that body, and in the 
General Assembly. By having these two nations admitted to the United 
ations and possibly to the Security Council, Stalin would reach his 
most important objective. 19 
This plan for formation of a Soviet bloc of states in the 
United Nations fitted in with the whole pattern of Soviet policy 
as analyzed by Averill Harriman in the fall of 1944 . 20 Stalin was 
more interested in Soviet security through the creation of a Soviet 
l8Jados, Documents, p. 157. 
19stettinius, p . 187.; U. S . Department of State , Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1945, pp . 197-198. 
20stettinius, p . 310 . 
bloc and through the creation of a ring by Soviet domination in 
the border countries than through the security offered by Soviet 
participation in the Grand Alliance in the United Nations . 21 
American Reaction to Soviet Demands 
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When Stalin presented his arguments in regard to the admis-
sion of two or three more Soviet republics, Roosevelt began to 
acquiesce for he felt that actual power would rest in the hands of 
the Grand Alliance in the Security Council . In that body, each country 
would have only one vote, and any one of the major powers could block 
the decision, in matters of enforcement, of a group of nations arrayed 
against it . Roosevelt felt, therefore, that two or three more Russian 
votes out of fifty in the General Assembly wouldn't make too much 
difference . 22 He was not, however, willing to see the security of 
the United States endangered by a bloc of Soviet votes in the Assembly. 
The San Francisco Conference 
Pre-Conference agreement among big powers. -- The major 
problems of each nation concerning the creation of a world organization 
were known long before the beginning of the San Francisco Conference. 23 
The various conferences of the foreign ministers and the heads of 
states of the big powers had done much either to solve or compromise 
these problems . By the time the conference began the decisions and 
21Welles, Harper's (March, 1951), p . 78. 
22stettinius, p . 188.; Jados, p . 170. 
23stettinius, pp . 283-285 . ; U.S. Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1945, pp . 712-719 . 
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compromises as to which was to have the higher order, world organi-
24 
zation or national sovereignty, had been reached by the big powers . 
The safeguarding of the national sovereignty and the national 
security for each of the big powers had been the fundamental objectives. 
These objectives had been reached by the recognition among the big 
powers that they were the only ones capable of keeping the peace , and 
that the small power ultimately must bend to the will of the big 
powers . Recognizing these facts, the big powers realized that, of 
necessity, they must be unified in their actions, but actions taken 
against their own interests must not be permitted. 
Conference voting procedures . -- In the first days of the 
conference it was decided that each delegate was to have one vote in 
each body of the conference in which it was represented, 25 and it 
was decided that a majority vote would suffice on n~thods of procedure, 
and a two- thirds majority would be necessary on other questions.26 
Small Eower inequality. -- The Charter of the United Nations 
has as its first principle that "The Organization is based on the 
sovereign equality of all members." 27 Despite this manifestation of 
equality the United ations is not primarily an organization in 
which principles of equality appear to occupy a paramount or even a 
24Dennet and Turner, VIII, pp . 361- 363 . 
25wellington Koo, Jr . , Voting Procedures in International 
Political Organizations ( ew York : Columbia University Press, 1947), 
P· 8. 
26u . s . Department of State, Selected Documents on the 
ations Confer ence on International Or anization (Washington : 
Government Printing Office , 19 6 , p . 75 . 
27Ibid . , p . 207 . 
United 
u . s . 
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principal place. The Security Council, with its methods of voting, 
denies at the outset the equality of the member states. 
Although some of the delegations from the small nations with 
the memory of Munich fresh in their minds were opposed to giving the 
Security Council any power to impose a particular settlement, most of 
the smaller nations were anxious to have the Security Council assume 
direct responsibility for keeping the peace and, therefore, did not 
t . th 1 . . . f 28 ques 1on e app 1cab1l1ty o the veto power. The smaller states 
at no time desired to possess the veto power themselves. They merely 
did not wish the larger states to be able to halt the machinery of 
the organization whenever it seemed to the small members that a de-
cision in the Security Council might injure the interests of the Big 
Powers. 29 
Attempts by small powers to limit the veto. -- Many methods 
and suggestions were put forth in the form of amendments by the small 
powers . Some of the amendments favored the enlargement of the number 
of non-permanent members in the Security Council, taking away some of 
its powers, of limiting its powers, or making it responsible in some 
manner to the General Assembly.30 The Soviet representative's reply 
was that actions of the Security Council should be fast and effective. 
The suddenness of enemy action during the last war, he said, ought to 
prove this point. 31 This was also the attitude of the United States. 
28 Koo, p. 124. 
29 ~·' p. 139. 
30 Selected Documents of UNCIO, pp. 267-400. 
31~., p. 253. 
Amendments to limit veto power. -- The Australian delegate, 
speaking for all the small nations, introduced several amendments 
which would have limited the veto power of the Bi g Five . 32 However, 
the amendment failed passage by a vote of ten pros, twenty cons, and 
fifteen abstentions.33 These abstentions were all cast by small powers 
who feared to vote for the amendments because the big powers made it 
quite clear that they would accept no further changes in the Yalta 
formula . 34 It was either the Charter with the veto or no Charter at 
all. 35 
Concessions to the small powers. -- In deference to the smaller 
nations the Charter did provide that, in the election of the six non-
permanent members of the Security Council, "due regard" is to be 
"especially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of members 
of the United I at ions to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and to the other purposes of the organization" . 36 "Due 
regard" was to be paid to "equitable geographical distribution"~7 
It was also decided that the Security Council should make annual re-
ports to the General Assembly as a concession to the small powers . 
32Ibid , p . 151; U. S . Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United states, 1945 , pp. 1340-1343 . 
33Koo, pp . 153-154 . 
34selected Documents of the UNCIO , p . 433 . 
35F. 0 . Wilcox, "Yalta Voting Formula in the Security Council ," 
American Political Science Review, 39 (October, 1945), p. 954 . 
36vera M. Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace (New York: 
\fui ttlesey House , 1946) , p . 7 . 
37Ibid . ; U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States;-1945, pp . 1126, 1199 . 
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vli th these concessions given to the smaller powers, voting 
on the Yalta formula was in favor of the Big Five. 38 
Checks on the big pmvers. -- Although the Big Powers retained 
control in the Security Council, there were checks on that power. The 
Big Five did not constitute a majority. The five powers must secure 
the votes of two other powers for action. The five non-permanent 
members can, by acting jointly, veto any decision of the big powers. 
And a most important check, no state or group of states can prevent 
any nation from bringing a dispute before the Security Council to 
obtain a hearing . 39 
But each of the great powers regarded the absolute protective 
veto as a safeguard for itself against any enforcement measures put 
forward to its disadvantage by any power or group of powers. The 
absolute protective veto was a precaution against any proposal that 
the small powers might make which would commit the big powers to action 
including troops without their consent. 40 
Signature and Ratification 
On the twenty- sixth day of June, 1945, the aspirations 
of mankind were fulfilled with the signing of the United ations Charter 
establishing a world organization to promote international peace and 
security . It remained for the member nations to approve and ratify 
the Charter. 
3Bnennet and Turner, VII, p. 447. 
39Norman J. Padelford, "The Use of the Veto" , International 
Organization (June , 1948), p . 229 . 
4owilcox, p . 952. 
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There was little doubt that the Charter would be ratified. 
The arguments presented to the Senate by members of the United States 
delegation precluded the idea that the United States would be involved 
in situations and wars about which she would have no say . John Foster 
Dulles made this point quite clear in a statement before the Foreign 
Relations Committee of the Senate : 
Actually the document before you charts a path which 
we can pursue joyfully and without fear . Under it we remain 
masters of our own destiny. The Charter does not sub-
ordinate us to any super government . There is no right on 
the part of the United Nations Organization to intervene 
in our domestic affairs without our consent. If the joint 
adventure fails , we can withdraw.4l 
With such arguments being presented , it was not unusual that 
the Senate ratified the Charter by a vote of 89 to 2 . As a result of 
this action the United States became the first nation in the world to 
ratify the Charter. 42 Ratification by Russia followed soon after . 
Conclusions in Regard to the Charter and 
the Unanimity Principle 
An attempt at security . -- The United States and the Soviet 
Union , in the search for security, had made a long twenty-year march from 
isolationism to international cooperation. 
In this march , both of these nations realized, as did the 
other signatory nations, that there were no idealistic, unrealistic 
objectives contained within the Charter . They all realized that the 
primary task of the United Nations was to answer the question of how 
to seek security both in the national and international field . 
41 Bartlett, p . 673 . 
42 Leopold, p . 632; Dean, p. 101 . ; U. S. Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 , p . 1281 . 
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The pr oblem of po,ver factor s . -- In the days following San 
Francis co, the dissent i ng votes of the major powers , primarily those 
of the U. S . S . R. , have pr evented action i n the Security Council . It 
was hoped that this would not happen , but the facts belie the 
princi ple . 
I t is not the fact t hat the vot ing problem itself is so 
i mport ant, be caus e the vote itself does not provide the real enforce-
ment . It is the f act that the vote would show whether r eal unanimity 
coul d be achi eved . Wi t h or without the vote , unle s s the b i g powers 
could agr ee on mat ters affecting their vit al i nt erests , there would be 
no peace and s ecurity . I t is not, ther efore, the veto i tsel f , but 
t he power f actors involved i n t he use of the veto whi ch has hamper ed 
t he eff ect i venes s of the United Nat ions . 
The great powers and unani mity . -- It would appear t hat the 
great powers had finally r eached agr eement on the type of wor ld or gani-
zation to be erected , an organi zation i n which the pr imary responsibili ty 
for the maintenance of world pe ace and s ecurity depended upon t he 
united action of t he gr eat powers who had been members of the Grand 
Alliance during Worl d War II. It r emained to be s een how t his pr in-
ciple of unanimity would break down in the days f ollowing San 
Francisco, be cause of irreconci l able differences bet ween t he Soviet 
Union and the United States . 
Weakness of the unanimity principle . - - The small nations 
realized the preponderance of power lay with the big nations . The 
Security Council could never take action without this power at its 
disposal, and the Council could never come to any decision if an act 
of aggression were committed by one of the big powers . The Security 
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Council would be unlikely to take any action against a small nation 
enjoying the aid and assistance of one of the big powers. All realized 
that the General Assembly was a sounding board of no real authority. 
And they all realized that it would be next to impossible to change 
the Charter in any way, shape or form without the consent of the big 
powers . 
But all of these nations felt that no organization could be 
made overnight. They felt that international organization rather than 
international anarchy contained the best hopes for peace and security, 
even if it meant the delegation of some of their national authority 
to that body . If it were possible in the future that the great 
powers really could establish a measure of security to the small nations, 
the small nations would find that they had exchanged the fear of war 
for the arts of peace, that they had exchanged a mere shadow of na-
tional sovereignty for the substance of security against aggression . 43 
43 Dean , p . 13 . 
CHAPI'ER IV 
THE GREEK CASE 
Introduction 
As has been suggested, it was not the failure of the voting 
formula itself that caused the breakdown of the unanimity principle 
which had been built up so carefully and arduously by the big powers 
during the war years. It was the problem of the power factors involved 
that caused the breakdown in the years which followed the defeat of 
Germany and Japan. 
It was hoped that in the Security Council of the United 
Nations the resolution of the power conflict between the two great 
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, might come about . A 
careful study, however, of one case which the Security Council under-
took to solve will shm• that Soviet Russia and American could not 
meet with the principle of unanimity. This Greek Case, in fact, will 
show that there were irreconcilable differences between Soviet concepts 
of security and American concepts of security which could not be re-
solved by any means at the disposal of the Security Council. 
Historical Background of the Greek Case 
Russian desire for influence in the Balkans . -- Historically, 
the Russia of the Czars was always interested in obtaining hegemony 
in the Balkan area to carry out two objectives . The first objective 
of Czarist Russia was to build a balance of power within the Balkan 
states to protect herself from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The 
second objective was to gain an outlet from the Black Sea into the 
Mediterranean. The Soviet Union in the years before World War II 
tried to monopolize the Balkans to build a balance of power against a 
resurgent Germany . The Soviet Union, also, was interested in 
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gaining control of the valuable oil fields in Rumania and the Near 
East,l in cutting off the supply lines of the Western countries to 
these areas, and extending the influence of the Soviet Union as far as 
possible . 
To accomplish these objectives, the Soviets attempted to 
block Western moves in the Balkan area. During World War II Soviet 
leaders objected strenuously to the opening on the part of the West 
of a second front in the Balkans . 2 To maintain the sphere of influ-
ence which U.s.s.R. had so carefully built up in the early days of 
World War II and to keep British influence in the Balkans from ex-
panding , an agreement was signed between Foreign Minister Molotov and 
Foreign Secretary Eden in 1944 which divided the Balkans into two 
spheres. This agreement stated that the British were to have only 
the control of Greece and the southern half of Yugoslavia. 3 After 
the end of World War II, the Soviet leaders realized that this agree-
ment did not fit in with their objectives. The Russian leaders 
decided, therefore, that the Molotov- Eden Agreement should be disre-
garded . Seizing upon the excuse that the British were maintaining the 
1Krout , p . 243. 
2nmytryshyn, p. 240. 
3stettinius, p . 11. 
Greek monarchy over the strenuous objection of the Greek people, the 
Soviets began to participate indirectly in the Greek problem by 
causing partisans from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to enter 
Greece and foment civil war. 4 The U. S . S.R. in 1946 also brought to 
the attention of the Security Council the question of British inter-
vention in Greece.5 By an analysis of these objectives and actions, 
it can be seen that the Soviet Union was vitally interested in 
breaking up the balance of power directed against her which had been 
created in the ear East by the Western powers. 
British desires for control of Greece . -- British interests 
in the Balkans were directly opposed to Soviet interests . Historically, 
Great Britain, prior to World War II, was interested in building a 
balance of power in the Balkans to be directed not only against 
Germany and her allies, but also against Soviet Russia. Great Britain 
also \vas interested in keeping her supply lines to the Near East open 
and, consequently, wanted to keep the Soviet fleet out of the 
Mediterranean . It was for these purposes that the Molotov-Eden 
Agreement of 1944 was agreed to by Churchill . 6 It was also for the 
purpose of keeping the Soviet Union from extending her control into 
Western Europe that Churchill had argued so vehemently for a Balkan 
campai gn instituted by the West . Great Britain was vitally interested 
~readgold , p . 415 . ; Jados , p . 181 . ; Frank Smothers , William 
H. McNeill, Repor t on Gree ce , (New York : Twentieth Century Fund , 
1948)' p . 152 . 
5Goodr i ch and Hambro , p . 59; Edward O' Ballance , The Greek 
Civil War , 1944- 1942 (New York : Frederick A. Praeger , 1966) , p . 211 . 
6nmytryshyn , p . 240 . 
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in maintaining the balance of power in the Balkans which Britain so 
assiduously helped to build. 
Post-Horld War II difficulties. -- In the early days follow·-
ing the end of World Vlar II the United States, Great Britain , and 
the Soviet Union realized that the power situation was now completely 
different from what it had been. The British had lost their supremacy 
in naval power and were searching about for some other means of pro-
tecting their supply lines. 
The United States had come to realize, with the loss of 
British sea power and protection for the \-/e stern hemisphere that the 
United States supply lines both in the Atlantic and Pacific areas 
were now threatened by Soviet expansionist tendencies and that 
America's vital interests no longer lay just in the Vlestern hemisphere, 
but had now become global in scope, and the Soviets were anxious to 
exploit every Western weakness in order to promote Soviet interests. 
These unsettled conditions in the world were focused in Greece 
in 1946 and 1947. The British were forced to admit they no longer 
had the power capabilities to maintain their troops and navy in Greece 
and asked the United States to replace them.7 This the United States 
did in order to protect American supply lines in the Mediterranean and 
Near East . This was also done to prevent the Soviets from filling 
the power vacuum left by the British in Greece . It was Administration 
thought, however, that both Greece and Turkey should contribute 
something in order to keep the Soviets out of not only the Mediterranean, 
but out of their countries as well . The United States put forward the 
7 Jados, p . 192 . 
58 
Truman Doctrine to seek these ends . 8 The Soviets exploited British 
and American weaknesses by indirectly fomenting civil war. 
Action in the Security Council. -- The Greek Question was 
first presented to the Security Council by the Soviet Union in a letter 
dated January 21 , 1946, invoking Article 35 of the Charter and charging 
that the presence of British troops in Greece was causing international 
tensions which were detrimental to the maintenance of peace and se-
curity. The matter, however, was declared closed by the Council after 
a full discussion had taken place and after it was declared that the 
Security Council had taken note of the views expressed . 9 
On August 24 , 1946, the question again came before the Council 
under Article 1 , Paragraph 2 and Article 35 , Paragraph 1 of the Charter 
because of charges of the Ukraine government that British troops in 
Greece were the primary cause of border violations and persecutions of 
minority groups . 10 Several resolutions were brought forward, by the 
U. S .S . R. ,11 by Belgium,12 by Poland and others for pacific settlement 
of the dispute . l3 They all failed passage and the discussion was 
again declared closed. 14 
8 Krout, p. 243 ; Ballance , pp. 141, 214 . 
9Goodrich and Hambro, p . 59. 
lOrbid . , p. 6o . 
llsecurity Council Official Records (Lake Suc cess: United 
Nations, 1946- -), First Year, Second Series, No . 13 , pp. 334- 335. 
12Ibid ., No . 16, p . 404 . 
13rbid ., p . 415-417. 
14Goodrich and Hambro, p. 60 . 
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Another solution under pacific settlement of disputes was 
sought when the Greeks on December 3, 1946 , charged that Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia t,.Jere giving support to the Greek guerillas . 
On December 19, 1946, an amended resolution of the United States to 
establish a commission of investigation was approved with the Soviet 
Union abstaining .15 The Security Council began its consideration on 
June 27 , 1947 , of the report of the commission, the majority of which 
members said Albania , Bulgaria , and Yugoslavia were aiding the Greek 
guerillas . 
The majority of the commission stated also that the Security 
Council should re commend to the four states concerned that they take 
such actions as deemed necessary to settle the dispute among them-
selve s in a peaceful manner . 16 A United States resolution incorporating 
these re commendations was rejected because of a Russian veto . 17 A 
Soviet r esolution in turn which put the blame on Greece and which 
called for the end of fo r eign intervention in Greece was rejected .18 
The Gr eeks then i nvoked Art i cle 39 of the Chart er , and the Australian 
delegat ion offe r ed a resolution whi ch placed the question under enforce-
ment measures of the Charter . This resolution and a subsequent 
r esol ution of the United States to the same effect was rejected by a 
Soviet veto . 19 
l 5securit y Council Official Re cords, Fi r st Year , Second 
Seri es, No . 28 , pp . 666- 691 . 
16Ibid ., No . 51 , pp . 1119- 1123 . 
17Ibid ., o . 66 , pp . 1602- 1612 . 
18Ibid., No . 69 , pp . 1726- 1730; Bal l ance , p . 191 . 
19s ecurity Counci l Offici al Records, Fi rst Year , Second 
Series, No. 79 , pp . 2093- 2099 . 
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Attempts on the part of the United States to let the General 
Assembly examine the question under the authority of Article 12 of the 
Charter met with a Soviet use of the "double" veto . The whole question 
was finally taken off the agenda of the Security Council and given to 
the General Assembly by means of a procedural vote. 20 
Russian Methods of Seeking Objectives 
No direct participation . -- By an examination of the official 
records of the Security Council discussion of the Greek question, it 
can be deduced what were the Soviet methods of achieving its objec-
tives . Although it was almost certain that the Soviet Union was the 
instigator of the Albanian, Bulgarian , and Yugoslavian aid to the 
Greek guerilla forces, the Soviet Union wisely kept from giving direct 
aid to those guerilla forces so that the Soviet representatives in the 
Security Council •rould be able to cast their votes under ''pacific 
settlement of disputes" . By not giving direct aid to the three Balkan 
countries but by upholding their viewpoints in the Security Council, 
the Soviet Union was able to indulge in a "war by proxy" to further her 
national objectives . The Soviet bloc also refused to participate in a 
sub- committee to be established under the authority of the Security 
Council . For this sub-committee, to the Soviet mind , would have kept 
the Soviet bloc in the minority and would have allowed the Anglo-
American bloc to retain a foothold in Greece . 21 Jn addition it would 
p . 1334 . 
20Goodrich and Hambro, p . 61; Ballance , p. 155 . 
2lsecurity Council Official Records, Second Year , No . 58 , 
have allowed the Anglo-American bloc to interfere in the affairs of 
Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and thus expand the influence of 
the Western bloc in the Balkans . 22 
Backing of the Soviet Satellite countries in the United 
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rat ions . The Soviet government backed completely the position taken 
by Albania, Bulgaria , and Yugoslavia for it was through these countries 
that the Soviets sought their objectives. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet 
representative, in a speech on September 26, 1946, said that the 
setting up of a commission of investigations as sought by the United 
States delegation would throw the guilt on Albania, Bulgaria, and 
Yugoslavia, thereby absolving the foreign interventionists in Greece . 23 
In another speech Gromyko said that the Western powers' 
attempt to throw the blame on Albania , Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia was 
an attempt to divert the attention of the Security Council to those 
questions which were non-existent . He continued by saying that the 
United States was seeking any method available in order to gain control 
of the rivers, oil fields, and fertile lands of the three Balkan 
countries under United States attack . 24 The Russian delegate, in 
another series of discussions on the same problem, said that the 
British did not want a full investigation in the Council, with Albanian, 
Bulgarian , and Yugoslavian representatives participating, because such 
an investigation would prove that the British were covering up their 
activities in Greece . The investigation would prove that the Brit ish 
were misusing the Security Council for their own interests and would 
22Ibid ., o . 59 , pp . 1346- 1356 . 
23Ibid . , First Year, Second Series, No . 16, pp . 396- 398 . 
24Ibid ., p . 382 . 
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also prove that the Albanians, Bulgarians, and Yugoslavs were correct 
in their charges that Greece, aided and abetted by the British and 
Americans, was the nation which had caused the trouble in the Balkans . 25 
The Soviet resolution of September 16, contained all the 
accusations and demands which the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav 
representatives had put be fore the Council . 26 This resolution said 
that monarchist elements in Greece were the cause of all the trouble 
for it was only these elements, in control of the Greek government, 
which were seeking to annex certain territories of her neighbors, which 
were persecuting certain minority ethic groups , and which were seeking 
to bring about armed conflict between Greece and Albania . This Russian 
resolution, as did the statements of the three northern neighbors of 
Greece, called upon Greece to put an end to border activities and to 
terminate the persecution of national minorities . The resolution also 
called upon the Security Council to keep the whole question on its 
agenda if the Greek government did not comply with the above recommenda-
tions. 
Use of the Security Council as a propaganda device . --
Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the editor of the Ne\.;r York Times , said, in 
regard to the question of the pacific settlement of the Greek question 
in the summer of 1946, that the whole plan of organization on the part 
of the Soviet bloc was to produce sufficient chaos in Greece , so that 
British and world public opinion would demand the withdrawal of 
British troops . 
25Ibid . , o. 6, pp . 151-156. 
26Ibid . , No . 13, pp . 334-335 . 
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This would produce a temporary postponement of the elections 
in Greece in order to strengthen the Leftist forces . 27 To put this 
statement in broader terms, the Russians were using the Security Coun-
cil as a propaganda device for two effects : (1) use the sovereignty 
principle to gain the support of the small nations, (2) to bring about 
a "fait accompli" by delaying tactics. Statements made in the Security 
Council point up this fact that the Russians were using the Security 
Council as a propaganda device . The British delegate , Cadogan, on 
September 5, 1946, referred to the Ukrainian charges and called them 
nothing but propaganda tactics to gain the support of the smaller 
countries vrhich might be taken in by such propaganda. He went on to 
say: 
So here you have it! His Majesty 's Government in the 
United Kingdom is responsible not only for all that may 
have gone wrong in Greece, it is responsible for the op-
pression of minorities , it is inciting Greece to attack her 
much more powerful neighbors, it has just faked a plebiscite . 
It has violated the Charter of the U~ited Nations . This 
is Mr . Manuilsky 's original charge . 2 
In order to prove, however , to the small nations that Britain 
and America were imperialist nations, Gromyko continually repeated 
the charge that foreign interventionists in Greece were causing the 
Greek people to live under an unpopular regime, and that these foreign 
interventionists were causing the Greek government to undertake actions 
29 This argument 
which violated the sovereignty of her neighbors. 
27Ibid ., No . 9 , p . 230 , quoting Arthur Hays Sulzberger, New 
York Times , July 26 , 1946. 
28Ibid., No . 9 , p . 243 . 
29Ibid ., No . 28, pp . 639- 647. 
was also used by the Yugoslav representative,30 the Albanian repre-
sentative,31 and the Bulgarian representatives . 32 Even as far along 
as August, 1947, Gromyko claimed that foreign troops and foreign aid 
for Greece was nothing but a form of enslavement, and the fact that 
this aid was requested by the Greek leaders was only proof that the 
Greek leaders were willing 
11 to sacrifice Greek independence and national sovereignty 
in order to maintain in Greece a regime which is not ~opu­
lar and vrhich is not supported by the Greek people . 11 3 
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Although the Soviet Union had maintained from the beginning 
that it did not desire to have the smaller nations have any voice in 
the world organization, the sovereign equality principle was used by 
the Soviet bloc in another manner to gain the support of the small 
nations . vfuen the Soviet and Polish delegates asked that Albania, 
Bulgaria , and Yugoslavia be permitted to join the commission which was 
to be established by the Council in December of 1946,34 these delegates 
were, in effect , promising the small nations that, in any such future 
commissions to be established, the Soviet bloc would see to it that the 
small nations would be able to protect their interests to a certain 
degree . 
vfuen the Commission reported to the Security Council in 
June of 1947, however, the Soviet bloc no longer maintained this 
30ibid ., pp . 661- 662 . 
3libid . , No . 51 , pp . 1129- 1143 . 
32Ibid ., No . 28, pp . 661- 662 . 
33Ibid ., Second Year , 1o . 69, pp . 1719- 1720 . 
34~. , First Year , Second Series , No . 28, pp . 652- 653 . 
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position. They now maintained that any such investigatory commission 
violated national sovereignty. One argument used in this Greek question 
was that a majority vote in any such commission would not guarantee 
just conclusions because the underlying purpose of any such commission, 
as proved in the Commission of Investigation in the Greek question, 
would be to keep up foreign interference or intervention by the Hestern 
pm·rers in any such country investigated. These Western poi.rers, the 
Soviets claimed, would know in advance that there would be no objec-
tivity in any such commission, because the Soviet bloc which was seeking 
to protect the sovereignty of all nations would ahrays be in the 
minority. 35 
Both Russia and her partner, Poland, claimed that any such 
commission as proposed by the Americans for the pacific settlement of 
disputes in the Greek case which allowed that commission to decide 
which acts were threats to the peace •rould throw the blar.1e equally 
on Albania, Bulgaria , and Yugoslavia and would, in effect, place all 
four of the Balkan countries under a United Nations trusteeship 
dominated by the Anglo- American bloc. No self-respecting soverei n 
nation could allow such blame to be placed on its shoulders no could it 
allow the establishment of such a trusteeship . 36 The Soviet delegate 
further maintained that, because Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia did 
not belong to the International Refugee Organization, any attempt to have 
that body take charge of refugees in those three countries would be in 
35Ibid ., Second Year, No . 76, pp. 1975-1977 . 
36Ibid., No . 59, pp . 1354-1356 . 
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violation of national sovereignty. Such an arrangement in any small 
country, the Soviet delegate maintained, would be just another form of 
trusteeship under domination of the Anglo- American bloc . 37 
With arguments such as these being presented by the Soviet 
bloc delegates, it can be seen that the Soviet concept of the so-
vereignty principle was that this principle should be used to protect 
not only the Soviet Union but also the Soviet Union satellites from 
penetration by Vlestern ideas and Western force . 
The Soviet delegate also stated that, although the Security 
Council did have the right to inquire into facts connected with a 
certain dispute or situation and to conduct an investigation in re-
gard to that dispute, all decisions under Chapter VI of the Charter 
dealing with pacific settlement including the right of conducting an 
investigation was only recommendatory. No country, as a result, had 
the legal obligation to allow an investigation to be conducted on its 
. 38 
own terr1tory, as such an investigation would be contrary to the 
domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter . 
The Soviets even used this principle of the sovereign right 
of nations when confronted with the fact that they had not partici-
pated in the four- power commission to supervise the Greek elections . 
By not participating they could claim that the small percentage of 
votes cast for Leftist candidates would prove that the Anglo-American 
bloc had "faked11 the elections. 39 Manuilsky, the Ukrainian delegate , 
37~., No . 76, PP · 1970-1977. 
38Ibi d ., No . 64 , PP· 1541-1542 . 
39Ibid ., First Year , Second Series, No . 9 , PP · 216- 222 . 
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said that the reason for Soviet non-participation in the commission 
was because the U.S . S .R. 
"regarded the establishment of such tutelage over G~0ece 
. . . as an intervention in the affairs of Greece." 
With all these arguments in favor of national sovereignty, 
with all the long speeches directed against American and British im-
perialism, and by the use of the veto, the Russians hoped to bring 
about a "fait accompli" which would see them in a position of dominance 
in Greece . Gromyko pointed this out in a speech to the Security 
Council on July 15, 1947, although he made the point in a rather back-
handed way. He said he did not believe the discussion on the Greek 
question should be speeded up, even although the Greek representative 
was claiming new disturbances along Greece's northern border. The 
claiming of these new disturbances was only for the purpose of having 
the resolutions of the Anglo-American bloc put into force as soon as 
possible by the Security Counci1 .
41 
Use of the veto . -- Speaking on the veto in connection with 
the Greek case, Gromyko said : 
The U. S.S . R. does not consider itself bound to agree 
on proposals on the Greek or any other question which, in 
the opinion of the government of U. S . S. R., are not in con-
formity with the interests of the maintenance of peace and 
the development of friendly relations between States, more 
especially if their ac~~ptance might only lead to still 
greater complications . 
The Russians were not eager to have commissions of investi-
gation in the Balkans for the purpose of solving the Greek question . 
40rbid ., No . 11 , p . 291 . 
4lrbid., Second Year , No . 58, pp . 1337- 1338. 
42rbid ., No . 76 , p . 1975 . 
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The Soviets did not \·rant to see the Security Council impose any en-
forcement measures detrimental to their interests in the Balkans . 
This is vrhy the Soviet Union used the "absolute protecti ve 11 veto in 
connection with the United States and Australian resolutions which 
vrould have imposed such measures . If one remembers that the Soviet 
Union 1 s concept of a world organization did not include the smaller 
nations 1 having a voice in the organization, it is not hard to see 
vrhy the Soviet Union in the Security Council made use of the "double" 
veto in connection vrith the United States proposal to turn the Greek 
question over to the General Assembly under authority of Article 12 
of the Charter. 
Bilateral agreements -- The Soviet Union, always fearful 
that the United I ations vrould take action contrary to Soviet policy 
in respect to Greece and the Balkans, propounded that the only way 
to solve the whole question would be through bilateral agreements 
worked out independently by Greece and each of her northern neighbors. 
Such a solution would settle these differences on a one to one basis.43 
Such a solution, hm-rever, vrould successfully drive out British 
and American influences in Greece . Such a solution would also enable the 
three northern countries of Greece to exert direct pressure on that 
country and would enable Russia, through her control of the three 
satellite countries, to exert indirect pressure on Greece. By such 
direct and indirect pressures, the Soviet Union hoped to force Greece 
under Soviet control . The Polish resolution of August 6, 1947, which 
43Ibid . , pp . 1968- 1974 . 
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would have caused the Greek government to make such bilateral agree-
ments was, however, voted down.44 
American Methods of Seeking Objectives 
Direct participation. -- Directly opposed to the Soviet 
method of non-participation in the affairs of Greece were the Ameri-
can and British methods of maintaining their influence and retaining 
the balance of power. United States officials never denied the fact 
that money, arms, and military missions were being sent to Greece 
to prevent the Leftist guerillas from seizing control of the Greek 
government . The purpose behind the Truman Doctrine as stated to the 
American Congress was that the United States could not 
"allow changes in the status quo ..• by such methods as 
coercion, 4Qr by any such subterfuges as political infil-tration." 5 
The British, too, never denied that they had their troops in Greece 
for the purpose of protecting British interests, but they did deny 
that the maintenance of such troops was in violation of the United 
Nations Charter . Cadogan, in a speech to the Security Council on 
September 25, 1946, pointed this out when he said: 
"It (The Charter) does not say that no Member of the United 
Nations may maintain troops in the territory of another 
Member at the request of the latter . " 
He continued by saying that the Charter only forbade the United ations 
as an independent body from interfering in the domestic affairs of a 
member state . 46 
44Ibid., No . 71, p . 1800 . 
45u .s. Department of State, Bulletin (Washington : U.S. 
Government Printing Office, May 4, 1947) , Supplement . 
46Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second 
Series , No . 9, p . 247 . 
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The fact that the United States and Great Britain ,.,ere vi tally inter-
ested in a four-power commission to watch over the Greek elections of 
1946 , also shows that these two countries were guarding their own 
interests and were not willing to see the Greek forces of the Left win 
the elections by political machination. 
The Soviets were correct in their viev~oint that the British 
and Americans were seeking to continue their influence in Greek af-
fairs through United Nations commi ssions. The British and Americans 
knew quite well that their views would prevail on any one of these 
commissions. For all the talk of having a committee of three or five 
selected on the basis of impartiality47 or a commission composed of all 
the members of the Security Council, and not just a commission of a 
group of nations, 48 the Americans and the British knew, by the very 
organization of the United Nations, that their viewpoints would be the 
.1. . . t 49 preva~ ~ng v~ewpo~n . 
Gain support of small nations. -- In reply to a charge by 
Manuilsky, the Ukrainian delegate, that a wall of votes was being organ-
ized against U. S . S . R. , Van Kleffens, the I etherlands representative, 
said: 
I hold the view that nobody has the right, if a vote 
threatens to go against him, to attribute sinister motives 
to people who have no sinister motives at all . 50 
47Ibid . , No . 16 , pp . 394-396 . 
48
rbid ., Second Year, No . 58, pp . 1328-1329. 
49Norman J . Padelford, ed . Current Readin s on International 
Relations (Cambridge : Addison-1vesley Press, 1947-- ), No . 3 January, 
1948 ) , p . 133 , quoting Thomas J . Hamilton , "The United Nations at 
World, Yale Review , Autumn , 1947 . 
5°secur ity Council Official Records, First Year , Second Series, 
No . 13 , p . 325 . 
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It was the method of the United States to have such small 
countries as the Hetherlands agree that their interests were the same 
as those of the United States , that the United States was protecting 
those interests, and that the United States had no sinister motives in 
that protection. vfuen the Council was called upon to decide whether 
to allow the Albanian and Bul garian representatives to argue their 
case before the Council, the Uni ted States delegate said 
• the Security Council should abide by the spirit 
of the Charter and grant the opportunity to be heard 
to the States concerned.51 
In the discussion on the report of the Commission of Inves-
tigation , the United States delegate said that the Security Council 
had no rights to decide , as was desired by the Soviet bloc, to interfere 
in the internal affairs of Greece except insofar as those affairs 
might be contributing to the s ituation along Greece's northern boun-
d 52 ary. 
The United States stand that the investigation committee had 
made the correct recommendations was upheld by the Brazilian delegate 
for he felt that even if the commission had used the wrong procedur e , 
in bringing out the facts , the wrong procedures could i n no way affect 
the conviction that a serious situation existed in northern Greece.5 3 
The United States delegate also maintained throughout the 
discussions that such situations which could be deemed dangerous 
should be taken care of immediately. 54 If the power problem could not 
5libid., No. 10, pp . 266-267. 
52Ibid, Second Year, No. 54, pp . 1204-1209. 
53~., p . 1211. 
54Ibid., No . 15, p . 387. 
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be resolved among the big powers in the Security Council, then the 
small nations of the General Assembly should be given the opportunity 
of making recommendations. 
Not only did the United States wish to shmr the small nations 
that the United States was interested in a fair hearing for all and 
was interested in protecting the sovereignty of other countries, but 
the United States, also, wanted to show the small nations that in-
direct Soviet domination of Greece meant a loss of soverei nty for that 
country . 
For this reason, Warren Austin, the United States delegate, 
claimed that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia , acting under Soviet guid-
ance , had no intention of settling their dispute by peaceful means nor 
did they wish to develop friendly relations with that country nor were 
they interested in the sovereign equality of Greece. Yugoslavia had vio-
lated Article 1 of the Charter, and Albania and Bulgaria had violated 
Article 2, Paragraph 6 of the Charter . 55 For these reasons, the United 
States delegate on August 4, 1947, voted against the Soviet resolution 
which would have branded Greece the aggressor nation and would have es-
tablished a commission to see to it that the people of Greece, and not 
the Greek government , were the recipients of foreign aid . 56 
Use of the United Nations to gain moral backing for 
policies . -- Coupled with the method of gaining support of the smaller 
nations by pointing out that the United States was interested in a fair 
55security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series , 
No . 51 , pp . 1120-1121 . 
56security Council Official Records , Second Year, No . 69, 
PP · 1726-1730 . 
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hearing for all countries, and interested in the protection of the 
sovereign rights of all nations, and that Soviet attempts to indirectly 
control Greece meant a loss of sovereignty for that country, was the 
method of using the United 1 at ions to gain moral backing for United 
States policies. 
To gain the support of the majority of the small nations and 
to gain the moral backing that such a majority carried with it, the 
United States was required to do three things . First of all , the 
United States was required to word proposals so that the small nations 
could adhere to them . In the defense of his government ' s proposal of 
December 18, 1946, Herschel Johnson , the United States delegate, 
declared : 
It seems to me to be the inescapable and self-evident 
duty of the Security Council to investigate the facts per-
taining to these border violations without attempting at 
this time , on the basis of present information, to pr ejudge 
the issues . For this reason my Government has instructed 
me to propose the setting up 9f a commission of investigation 
to ascer tain the facts ... 5 
The res olution itself vas •rorded so as to appear that the 
United Nations and the Security Council were gaining full control of 
the situation . The commission was able to investigate in all areas 
concerned , and yet the sovereignty of nations would be protected by 
having the Secretary-General of the United Nations make all arrange-
ments of entry into certain countries . 58 The wording of the United 
States proposal of June 27 , 1947 , 59 as amended by various small 
57Ibid . , First Year , Second Series, No . 27, pp . 629- 631 . 
58Ibid . 
59Ibid ., No . 51 , pp . 1124- 1126. 
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powers, contained the substance of the recommendations as proposed by 
the majority of the investigating committee. This resolution, be-
cause of that wording, was subscribed to by nine out of eleven members 
of the Council on July 29, 1947. The Soviet Union blocked its passage 
by use of a veto.60 Even the resolution of September 15, 1947, was 
worded to show the small nations and the people of the world that the 
United States was interested in having a solution worked out by the 
United Nations in the General Assembly if necessary.6l 
If the United States method was to gain the support of the 
smaller nations and gain the moral backing of the United Nations in 
support of United States policies, it follows that such a method would 
necessarily call for Soviet vetoes on American proposals . 
As was stated by the Ukrainian delegate at the outset of the 
discussion, a wall of votes was being organized against the U.S . S . R. by 
the Anglo-American bloc . The Polish delegate also referred to this 
problem on August 19, 1947: 
We must decide whether we really want to reach such 
a solution, or whether the aim of the Council is merely to 
cause more vetoes from one side to another. 
I understand that for some reasons a veto may be very 
useful for certain Member States. However, purposely to 
cause a veto to be used by submitting new resolutions which 
we know beforehand serves neither the authorit~2nor the dignity 
of the Council, nor indeed the cause of peace . 
Forcing the Soviets to use the veto even in the face of a 
majority vote was just another method of the United States to prove 
60Ibid., o. 66, pp. 1602- 1612 . 
61Ibid ., No . 89 , p . 2369 . 
62security Council Official Records, Second Year Series , 
o . 58, p . 132 . 
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to the smaller nations that Soviet interests were not those of the 
smaller nations. 
Small povrers as Conciliators 
Although the small powers found that they could agree more 
readily with the United States proposals than with the proposals of 
the Soviet bloc, these smaller povrers vrere not willing to support the 
United States proposals in order to condemn the Soviet bloc. The 
small nations' position was stated very clearly by the Columbian re-
presentative in the Security Council: 
We cannot help saying that it has given us great 
concern to see that they (the United States and U. S .S .R.) 
are conflicting to a degree that seems to rule out any 
attempt by the representatives gf the small nations 
to approach the Greek question. 3 
The Australian delegate said he did not want to see the 
Security Council become a place where opposition between the Great 
Powers is accentuated . 64 The Columbian representative speaking in 
behalf of the small nations believed that the Security Council should 
not seek to impose a settlement which would increase the tension 
between the East and West. The Council should act as a conciliator 
and suggest ways and means of working out their difficulties by them-
selves. To this end a commission of good offices and conciliation with 
headquarters in a neutral country would be established for the dis-
putants to work out their differences . 65 
b3Ibid ., No . 5U, p . 1321. 
b4Ibid., First Year, Second Series, No . 13, pp . 329-333. 
b)Ibid ., Second Year, No . 58, pp . l3cc-l3c5 . 
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In further discussion, the smaller nations came to the con-
elusion that diplomatic relations between all four countries should be 
established, before any attempts at good-neighborliness could be 
made. 66 The Greek question was not resolved in the Security Council 
nor the United Nations, even with the small powers' action as concili-
ators, because of the East-West power factors involved. 
The problem was, therefore, turned over to the General As-
sembly . It is not within the scope of this paper to study the 
resolution of the Greek question within the General Assembly, but note 
should be taken of the fact that the Assembly did, through its broad 
powers of recommendation and investigation, call upon the parties 
directly concerned to settle their dispute peacefully and make 
recommendations looking to the establishment of normal relations 
between these parties . The General Assembly also established a Special 
Committee to aid in carrying out the above recommendations. The Soviet 
bloc announced its non-cooperation with this committee and by its 
action seriously hampered the effectiveness of the committee . It was 
not until Yugoslavia broke away from the Cominform that a measure of 
peace was restored to Greece. 
General Conclusions 
General Soviet objectives . - - This study of the Greek question 
will show the global objectives of both the Soviet Union and the United 
States . The Soviets, by their proposals, vetoes, and propaganda in 
the Security Council, showed that they were interested only in using 
66!bid . , No . 63, pp . 1479-1489. 
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the United ations to further their national objectives . By the use of 
such methods, they sought to expand the influence of the Soviet Union 
and Communism not only in Greece and the Balkan area, but throughout 
the world. 
By using the principle of sovereign equality the Soviets were 
attempting to wean the smaller nations away from the Anglo-American 
sphere of influence and have these nations enter the Soviet sphere . 
By the use of the sovereignty principle, the Soviets sought to prevent 
other nations and organs of the United Nations from entering the Anglo-
American sphere of influence as well . By recommending bi- lateral 
agreements as a solution for disputes, the Soviets further sought to 
drive out American and British influence in the smaller countries while 
bringing these smaller countries into the Soviet sphere . With the use 
of bi-lateral agreements and by the support of nations such as Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, the Soviets were seeking to create a balance 
of power or a security belt for themselves outside the United r ations 
framework . 
General American objectives . - - With the Greek question again 
as a frame of reference, America's global objectives can be seen . By 
attempting to show that the smaller nations ' interests were the same as 
thos e of the United States , by attempting to show the smaller nations 
that Soviet domination meant a loss of sovereignty, by attempting to 
gain moral backing for United States policies , and by participating 
directly in the United Nations, the United States was seeking to retain 
the balance of power once directed against Hitler and now directed 
against the U. S . S . R. By the use of such methods , America was also 
seeking to protect herself and the Western hemisphere from attack . 
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The methods outlined above would, United States leaders felt, bring 
about this protection . 
Inability of the United ations to act as an independent 
agen~. - -The Greek case , however, shows most clearly that the United 
Nations cannot act as an independent agent to settle disputes if two 
great powers are in fundamental disagreement . The United Nations can 
only act if those nations are willing to delegate supreme authority to 
the United Nations . Because each nation is continually seeking more 
power in the maintenance of its vital inter ests , nations are not willing 
to delegat e supr eme authority to an inter national body . Because of this 
di l emma and because the United Nations had been launched in an alr eady 
polari zed world ,67 the United Nations has been unable to t ake inde -
pendent act ion i n important cases . 
Furthermore , basic differences in philosophy and disagree-
ments on objectives in the field of collective security between the 
U. S . S . R. and the United States render action on the part of the United 
68 
Nations i mposs i ble when these two countr ies are oppos ing each other . 
The United States seeks a preservat i on of the st at us quo in mat ters of 
s ecurit y, while t he U. S . S . R. is consistently s eeki ng a r evision . 69 
But i n the United Nat i ons the United Stat e s has favored a "loose 
construction" of the Charter i n f urther ance of its own secur ity , while 
67Edward Buehring , "The United States, The United Nations, and 
Bi-Polar Politics", I nternational Organization, IV, 4 (November, 1950), 
p . 576 . 
68Joseph E . Johnson, "The Soviet Union, The United States and 
International Security", International Organization, I I I , l (February , 
1949 ) ' p . 7. 
69Ibid ., p . 2 . 
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the Soviet Union has insisted on a "strict construction" in furtherance 
of its security .7° While both nations gain from membership in the 
United Nations, the United Nations, because of these basic differences 
in concepts and attitudes, becomes only another arena where power poli-
tics are played . The very fact that both the Soviet Union and the 
United States are permanent members of the Security Council shows that 
power politics cannot be contained within the limits of the Charter .71 
It can also be seen from the Greek case that the United Nations 
is not equipped to take action in an international civil war, and it 
is not equipped to take action if one great power is backing a smaller 
nation in any dispute . The great powers are not willin to delegate 
supr eme authority to settle disputes to an international body. Such 
a delegation of authority might be detrimental to national interests 
and might mean the abandonment of basic concepts of belief . 
7°rbid ., p . 11 
71Buehring , P . 581 . 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS I REGARD TO SECURITY AND 
UNANIMITY 
Soviet Security Objectives 
The conclusions from this analysis of security concepts in 
regard to unanimity are rather easy to discern. The Soviet leaders 
feel that security can be best achieved by an expansion of both the 
Soviet Union and Communism. Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate to 
the United Nations, made this statement regarding Soviet policy: 
Soviet policy is based on entirely different 
principles, on basically new principles . Its main 
function is to secure peace for the peoples of the 
Soviet land, and to create external political condi-
tions which are necessary for their peaceful, 
creative work.l 
Stalin himself had said that the Russian revolution resulted 
in the establishment of the "first proletarian dictatorship" which 
was to be "a powerful and open base for the world revolutionary move-
ment. "2 The Soviet leaders realized that this Soviet expansion could 
not come about through peaceful means 3 alone and that wars to attain 
this expansion, therefore, were not to be considered as unjust~ can be 
1security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, No. 32, p . 3 . 
2Ibid ., No . 31 , pp. 22-23, quoting Stalin, On the Problems 
of Leninism:-fl928) 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid . , quoting Short History of the Communist Party . 
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found in the various writings of the Soviet leaders, in the writings 
published under Soviet government auspices,5 and in the writings of 
various students of International Russian policy. 6 The Soviets are 
strict adherents to the idea that 
he who rules East Europe commands the Heartland , he who 
rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, and he who 
rules the World-Island rules the World.7 
Such statements are borne out by Soviet action. The Soviet 
government seeks to expand the influence of Russia and Communism in 
81 
several ways. The Soviets expand their influence by giving economic, 
military and moral support to those underdeveloped nations and groups 
which are willing to spread Communist doctrine. The setting up of 
the Comintern, Cominform, and the backing of Albanian, Bulgarian, and 
Yugoslavian guerillas in Greece are but three examples of how the 
Soviet Union, by supporting nations and groups within its sphere of 
influence, 8 seeks to expand. The Soviet Union also seeks to expand 
by bringing the smaller nations within the Soviet sphere of influence, 
by claiming that the Soviet Union is vitally interested in the protec-
tion of national sovereignty, and by claiming that the Anglo-Americans 
5Ibid . , quoting Bolshevik . 
6Historiaus", "Stalin on Revolution", Foreign Affairs, XXVII 
(January, 1949), pp. 175-214. See also Mintauts Chakste, "Soviet 
Concepts of the State, International Law and Sovereignty", AJIL 
(January, 1949) 
7Bemis, p . 463, quoting H. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals 
and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York, 1919) . 
~he Korean affair showed how the U. S. S . R. militarily sup-
ported its satellite neighbors and how the U. S. S. R. gave political and 
moral support to those nations in the United Nations . 
--------
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are an imperialist bloc. The proposals of the Soviet government in 
the thirties for total disarmament and the proposal of the Soviet 
government to prohibit the use of atomic weapons are other examples o 
how the U.S.S . R. hopes to gain the support of the smaller nations. 
Concurrent with the objectives of the Soviet government to 
expand the influence of the U.S.S.R. and Communism for security reasons 
is the objective of protecting Russian sovereignty from outside inter-
ference and influence. Soviet demands for unanimity among the big 
powers in the Security Council shows how Russia sought to prevent the 
smaller nations from taking any action detrimental to Soviet sovereign-
ty and security. This unanimity principle, carrying with it the ri ght 
of veto, could also prevent any other big power or combination of 
powers within the Security Council from making any decision or taking 
any action deterimental to Soviet security . 
The policies of expanding Soviet-Communism while preventing 
other nations from entering the Soviet sphere of influence were combined 
in Russian attempts to build various balances of pmrer . The proposals 
of the Soviet government for total disarmament would have enabled the 
U. S . S.R . to build a favorable balance of power in the economic and 
political fields while preventing other nations from using armed force 
to enter the Soviet sphere. Soviet action in the League was aimed 
primarily against a Germany threatening Soviet security . 
Soviet use of the absolute unanimity principle in the League , 
was a means of preventing any League action detrimental to Soviet vital 
interests . When the attempt to use the League failed the U. S . S . R. 
sought its objectives of expansion without retaliation by other means . 
-----~---
The taking of territory from Finland, the absorption of the Baltic 
states, and the division of Poland with Germany were all for the 
purpose of expanding Great Russian Chauvinism. 
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During and after the defeat of Germany, the Soviet Union in-
sisted on unanimity among the big powers as a balance against a 
resurgence of power on the part of her enemy. Unanimity also prevented 
decisions and actions detrimental to Soviet vital interests from 
being taken by the Security Council in the United Nations. The Soviet 
Union, however, did not rely on the unanimity principle alone to 
protect its vital interests . With the creation of the various 
"People's Republics", with the retention of Soviet armed force, 
and by fomenting civil wars throughout the world the Soviet Union has 
sought to build balances of power which would allow her to expand 
while protecting the Soviet sphere from ideas, influences, and 
armed forces detrimental to Soviet sovereignty and security. 
The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union for total dis-
armament of conventional weapons and the prohibition of the atomic 
bomb are examples of how the Soviet Union sought to gain equality in 
the military field while gaining superiority in the economic field. 
The Soviet demand for the retention of the unanimity principle also 
shows how that country protects its soverei gnty by preventing discus-
sion, investigation, and enforcement in the Security Council on 
matters which might jeopardize Soviet security . The gaining of 
equality in some fields while gaining superiority in others is a 
planned policy , and not just happenstance, on the part of the Soviet 
government. This can be seen by examining statements made by Soviet 
leaders ana their spokesmen.9 
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Soviet actions in the United ations have shown that the 
U.S.S.R. wants the United Nations to be used as a balance against 
resurgent enemy powers threatening Soviet security but it is unwilling 
to allow the United ations to become an anti-Soviet coalition. 
Soviet actions in the United Nations also show that the U.S.S.R. is 
attempting to break the balance of power held by the Western bloc, 
and that the Soviet Union is attempting to convince not only the 
people within its own orbit, but others that the U.S.S.R. is not an 
aggressor nation. Thus the unanimity principle has become for the 
Russians yet another means of seeking objectives of expansion of 
the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviets are also interested in 
retaining the unanimity of the Big Four for this means the retention 
of the veto. With the use of the veto, the Soviets can prevent any 
action which might jeopardize Soviet policy and vital interests at 
any time . 
American Security Objectives 
Although the United States has no such doctrinaire principles 
or statements on which to base foreign policy, this analysis of the 
development and subsequent breakdown of the unanimity principle leads 
to several conclusions concerning American foreign policy. The primary 
purpose of American foreign policy is to protect the United States. 
One objective, therefore, of American policy is to halt any moves 
threatening American supply lines . The Lend-Lease program, the Anglo-
9 
Security Council , Official Records , Fifth year, No . 31, 
pp. 22- 23 . 
------------ --------
British "alliance" of 1941, the declaration of war against Germany 
were all designed to protect the supply lines of America in the North 
Atlantic. Present United States adherence to N.A.T.O. is for the 
same purpose. It was for the purpose of protecting American interests 
in the Mediterranean and Near East that America extended aid to 
Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine . 
'l'o further protect America 's position, the American govern-
ment has from its founding, sought to protect the Western hemisphere 
from attack. The Monroe Doctrine with all its corollaries was an 
outgrowth of this objective. The promulgation of the "Good Neighbor" 
policy and the delineation of security zones around the Western hemi-
sphere at the outset of World War II were just other aspects of 
strengthening the Monroe Doctrine . When the United States found 
that it could not hope to protect the Western hemisphere with the 
loss of British naval power, the United States entered into World 
War II. 
It was for the purpose of using a collectivity of nations 
to protect the Western hemisphere and, in particular, the United States 
that America has tried to block Communist expansionist moves through-
out the world as was done in Greece .10 It was to protect American 
security by blocking Soviet expansionist moves that the Marshall 
plan was engineered. 
Present-day America has found it necessary to join in alli -
ances which will further protect American supply lines throughout the 
world and which will further protect the Western hemisphere from 
attack . To protect the American supply lines in the North Atlantic 
1
'{:And as is now being done in Vietnam ] 
area from German attack during World War II was one of the reasons 
why the United States was willing to become a partner of the Grand 
Alliance. 
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The United States, as did the U.S.S.R., had hoped that the 
Grand Alliance and its continuation after the war in the Security 
Council of the United Nations could be used as a balance of power 
against a resurgent Germany. It was for this purpose and for the 
purpose of protecting American sovereignty that the United States 
adhered to the unanimity principle. When it became clear, however, 
that Soviet actions inside and outside the United Nations threatened 
American security, the United States began to build a balance of power 
against the Soviet Union . A military and economic balance of power 
was created by the United States with the creation of the European 
Recovery Program. A balance was upheld in the Near East with the 
granting of United States aid to Greece and Turkey. 
A further attempt on the part of the United States to build 
a balance of power within the framework of the United Nations occurs 
as the United States attempts to show the smaller nations that their 
interests are linked with those of the United States as the United 
States attempts to build a solid bloc of world opinion against the 
Soviet Union . 
American actions in the United Nations show that America, 
too, is not adverse to using the United Nations to gain national 
objectives . American peace and security can be promoted by gaining 
-- ------
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world moral backing and thus creating a bloc against Soviet moves.ll 
The United States, to further halt Russian expansionist moves threaten-
ing American security, has extenaed aid outside the framework of the 
United lations to those countries which have been engaged in shooting 
wars with countries or groups under Soviet domination. Such was the 
case when the United States acting under the •rruman Doctrine sent 
arms and military missions to Greece, Korea, and now Vietnam . The 
United States has, with the approval of the majority of Security 
Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, sent arms and 
troops to countries which are engaged in halting the expansion of 
Soviet satellites. 12 
It becomes clear, therefore, that if American concepts of 
security coincide with Soviet concepts of security the unanimity 
principle will be adhered to by the United States. If American 
security, however, becomes endangered by Soviet action, the United 
States will seek to break loose from its adherence to the unanimity 
11security Council, Official Records , Fifth Year, No . 17, 
p . 12. Statement by Warren Austin in the Security Council in 
regard to the Korean question, June 30, 1950: 
and that, above everything else, the great 
value of what we are witnessing and participating in 
today is the moral power of united public opinion, and 
that it may be strong enough to bring peace without 
the shedding of more blood. 
Also Ibid ., o . 39, p . 15 . Statement by Ernest Gross in the Security 
Council in regard to the Korean question on September 7, 1950 . 
12of ., New York Times, June 30, 1950, p . 1 . The statement 
of Secretary of State Acheson in regard to American action in con-
nection with the Security Council resolution of June 27 , 1950, 
made it quite clear that United States action in support of the 
authority of the United Nations was taken to support the existing 
status quo in the Pacific area. 
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principle. If American security interests are endangered by constant 
application of the veto, then American leaders are not adverse to 
putting a limitation on that use.l3 
The United States was able to get around Soviet use of the 
"double" veto in the Greek case by sending that case to the General 
Assembly by suggesting that the case be removed from the agenda of 
the Security Council.l4 The very fact that the United States wanted 
the General Assembly to discuss the matter shows that the United 
States was trying to have the case settled to its advantage unhampered 
by the Soviet use of the veto . 
Conclusions in Regard to the Principle of Unanimity 
History has shown that no important unanimous decisions 
among all the members of the League were possible , for there were too 
many fundamental conflicts and varieties of interests not only between 
the smaller and larger powers , but among the great powers themselves . 
It was thought that unanimity among the Big Four could be achieved 
in the United Nations and so it might have been if there had been 
another power endangering the security and sovereignty of the Big 
Four. But with the Big Four themselves in fundamental conflict, there 
can be no unanimity and, subsequently , no action on the part of the 
United ations acting as an independent agent . 1 5 
l3cf ., Inter nat i onal Organization , V, l , 68. The Acheson 
"Uniting for Peace" proposals are an attempt on the part of the United 
States to limit the Russian use of the veto so as to enable the United 
States to halt Communist expansion in the Pacific and in other areas 
where such expansion might endanger United States supply lines and 
security . 
l4security Council, Official Records , First Year, Second 
Series , No . 89 , p . 2404 . 
l5Ibid ., Fifth Year , No . l5ff . 
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Power politics played outside the United Nations of necessity 
enters the United Nations, for each great power only seeks another 
arena where it can expand its influence. The Greek case points out 
the fact that no enforcement action can be taken by the United Nations 
in an international civil war, and no enforcement action can be taken 
against a smaller nation if one of the great powers supports that 
smaller nation. In other words, the United Nations is incapable of 
establishing a balance of power in favor of one group of nations or 
another and is incapable itself of acting as a third force to settle 
important differences among the big powers. 
At the present time it does not seem likely that any inter-
national organization will be given supreme authority because the 
great nations are not willing to place their security in the hands of 
another body. When these nations, that is, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, are willing to delegate supreme authority to a world 
organization, or are willing to forego the playing of power politics 
in the international field, will there be any likelihood for peace, 
security, and unanimity among nations. 
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APPEr DIX 
Statement of the American Position on Voting in the Security Council as 
Read by Secretary of State Stettinius at the Third Formal Meet-
ing of the Crimea Conference1 
1 . Review of the Status of the Question 
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would 
remain under consultation for future settlement . Of these , the 
princi ple one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the 
Securi ty Council . 
At Dumbarton Oaks, the three delegates thor oughly explored the 
whole question . Since that time the matter has received continued ex-
tensive study by each of the three governments . 
On December 5, 1944 , the President sent to Marshal Stalin and 
to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by 
making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals read as 
follows: 
11 C. Voting 
1 . Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote . 
2 . Deci sion on procedural matters shall be made by an 
affirmative vote of seven members . 
3 . Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters 
should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members 
including the concurring votes of the permanent members; 
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VII , Section A 
and under the second sentence of Paragr aph l of Chapter VII, 
Sect i on C, a party t o a dispute shall abstain from voting . 
2 . Analysis of t he American Proposal 
(a ) We believe that our proposal i s ent i r ely consistent with 
the spe cial r e spons ibi lities of the gr eat power s for the 
pr es e rvation of the peace of the world . In this respect 
our pr opos al call s fo r the unqualified unanimity of the 
per manent members of the Council on all maj or decisions 
r elating t o t he preservation of t he peace , including all 
mi litary and enforcement measures . 
(b) At t he s ame time our propos al r e cogni zes the desirability 
of t he per manent members f rankl y stating that the peace-
ful adj ustment of any controversy which may arise i s a 
1Edward R. Stet tinius, Roosevelt and t he Russians (New York : 
Doubleday & Company, 1949 ), pp. 140- 143 ; U. S . Department of St ate , 
The Forei n Relations of the Uni t ed Stat es : The Confe rences at 
Cairo and Tehran, 12 3, Washington D. C. , U. S . Government Printing 
Office , 1961) , p. 735 . 
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matter of general world interest in which any sovereign 
member state should have the right to present its case . 
We believe that, unless this freedom of discussion is 
permitted in the Council, the establishment of a World 
Organization which we all so earnestly desire in order 
to save the world from a tragedy of another war would be 
seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion 
in the Council, the Organization , even if it could be 
established, would be vastly different from the one we 
have contemplated . 
(c) Reasons for the American Position 
From the point of view of the United States Government , 
there are two important elements in the matter of 
voting procedure . First , there is the necessity for 
unanimity among the permanent members for the preserva-
tion of the peace of the world . Second , it is of par-
ticular importance to the people of the United States 
that there be a provision for a fair hearing for all 
members of the organization both large and small . 
We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to 
Marshall Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 of last year 
pr ovide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine 
these t wo main considerations . 
It is our earnest desire that our two great Allies will find 
it possible to accept the President ' s proposals . 
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